Eric Steven Raymond | Homesteading the Noosphere（智域拓荒：开源世界的产权与文化 - 2000）

注：本文为 "开源世界的产权与文化" 相关译文。

英文引文，机翻未校。

如有内容异常，请看原文。

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Homesteading the Noosphere

智域拓荒：开源世界的产权与文化

Eric Steven Raymond Date: 2000/08/25 02:59:06

Copyright © 2000 by Eric S. Raymond

版权所有 © 2000 埃里克·S·雷蒙德

Copyright

版权声明

Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the Open Publication License, version 2.0.

依据《开放出版许可证》2.0 版本的条款，允许复制、分发和/或修改本文档。

Revision History

修订历史

Revision 1.2224 August 2000 Revised by: esr

DocBook 4.1 conversion.

版本 1.2224 2000年8月 修订人：esr

完成 DocBook 4.1 格式转换。

Revision 1.2131 Aug 1999

Revised by: esr

Major revision for the O'Reilly book. Incorporated some ideas about the costs of forking and rogue patches from Micha

版本 1.2131 1999年8月

修订人：esr

为欧莱礼图书进行重大修订。纳入了米哈关于分支成本和非官方补丁的部分观点。

Revision 1.1421 November 1998

Revised by: esr

Minor editorial and stale-link fixes.

版本 1.1421 1998年11月

修订人：esr

进行小幅编辑调整及失效链接修复。

Revision 1.1011 July 1998

Revised by: esr

Remove Fare Rideau's reference to 'fame' at his suggestion.

版本 1.1011 1998年7月

修订人：esr

根据法尔·里多的建议，删除其关于"声誉"的相关表述。

Revision 1.9 26 May 1998

Revised by: esr

Incorporated Faré Rideau's noosphere/ergosphere distinction. Incorporated RMS's assertion that he is not anticommercial.

版本 1.9 1998年5月26日

修订人：esr

纳入法尔·里多关于智域（noosphere）与功域（ergosphere）的区分。纳入 RMS 关于自身并非反商业的声明。

Revision 1.8 27 April 1998

Revised by: esr

Added Goldhaber to the bibliography. This is the version that will go in the Linux Expo proceedings.

版本 1.8 1998年4月27日

修订人：esr

将戈德哈伯纳入参考文献。本版本将收录于 Linux 博览会论文集中。

Revision 1.7 16 April 1998

Revised by: esr

New section on 'Global implications' discusses historical trends in the colonization of the noosphere, and examines the '

版本 1.7 1998年4月16日

修订人：esr

新增"全球影响"章节，探讨智域开拓的历史趋势，并分析"

Revision 1.3 12 April 1998

Revised by: esr

Typo fixes and responses to first round of public comments. First four items in bibliography. An anonymously contributed

版本 1.3 1998年4月12日

修订人：esr

修正拼写错误并回应首轮公众反馈。确定参考文献前四项。纳入一份匿名贡献的

Revision 1.2 10 April 1998

Revised by: esr

First published on the Web.

版本 1.2 1998年4月10日

修订人：esr

首次在网络上发布。

After observing a contradiction between the 'official' ideology defined by open-source licenses and the actual behavior of hackers, I examine the actual customs which regulate the ownership and control of open-source software. I show that they imply an underlying theory of property rights homologous to the Lockean theory of land tenure. I then relate that to an analysis of the hacker culture as a 'gift culture' in which participants compete for prestige by giving time, energy, and creativity away. Finally, I examine the implications of this analysis for conflict resolution in the culture, and develop some prescriptive implications.

观察到开源许可证所定义的"官方"意识形态与黑客的实际行为之间存在矛盾后，我对规范开源软件所有权与控制权的实际惯例进行了研究。研究表明，这些惯例蕴含着一种与洛克式土地所有权理论同源的产权理论。随后，我将这一理论与黑客文化的分析相结合，指出黑客文化是一种"礼物文化"------参与者通过奉献时间、精力和创造力来争夺声望。最后，我探讨了这一分析对该文化中冲突解决的意义，并提出了一些规范性启示。

1. An Introductory Contradiction

1. 引言：一种矛盾现象

Anyone who watches the busy, tremendously productive world of Internet open-source software for a while is bound to notice an interesting contradiction between what open-source hackers say they believe and the way they actually behave -- between the official ideology of the open-source culture and its actual practice.

任何观察过互联网开源软件领域那繁忙而极具生产力景象的人，都必然会注意到一个有趣的矛盾：开源黑客所宣称的信仰与他们的实际行为之间，即开源文化的官方意识形态与其实践之间，存在着差异。

Cultures are adaptive machines. The open-source culture is a response to an identifiable set of drives and pressures. As usual, the culture's adaptation to its circumstances manifests both as conscious ideology and as implicit, unconscious or semi-conscious knowledge. And, as is not uncommon, the unconscious adaptations are partly at odds with the conscious ideology.

文化是适应性机制。开源文化是对一系列可明确识别的驱动力与压力的回应。与通常情况一样，文化对环境的适应既表现为有意识的意识形态，也表现为隐性的、无意识或半意识的认知。而且，并不罕见的是，这种无意识的适应在一定程度上与有意识的意识形态相冲突。

In this paper, I will dig around the roots of that contradiction, and use it to discover those drives and pressures. We will deduce some interesting things about the hacker culture and its customs. We will conclude by suggesting ways in which the culture's implicit knowledge can be leveraged better.

本文将深入探究这一矛盾的根源，并借此揭示那些驱动力与压力。我们将推导出关于黑客文化及其惯例的一些有趣发现。最后，我们将提出如何更好地利用该文化中隐性知识的方法。

2. The Varieties of Hacker Ideology

2. 黑客意识形态的多样性

The ideology of the Internet open-source culture (what hackers say they believe) is a fairly complex topic in itself. All members agree that open source (that is, software that is freely redistributable and can readily be evolved and modified to fit changing needs) is a good thing and worthy of significant and collective effort. This agreement effectively defines membership in the culture. However, the reasons individuals and various subcultures give for this belief vary considerably.

互联网开源文化的意识形态（即黑客所宣称的信仰）本身是一个相当复杂的话题。所有成员都认同，开源软件（即可以自由再分发、且能轻松演进和修改以适应不断变化需求的软件）是一件好事，值得投入大量集体努力。这种共识实际上界定了该文化的成员资格。然而，个人及各个亚文化群体支持这一信仰的理由却大相径庭。

One degree of variation is zealotry; whether open source development is regarded merely as a convenient means to an end (good tools and fun toys and an interesting game to play) or as an end in itself.

其中一个差异维度是狂热程度：开源开发究竟仅被视为实现目的的便捷手段（获取好用的工具、有趣的玩具以及参与一场有趣的"游戏"），还是被视为目的本身。

A person of great zeal might say "Free software is my life! I exist to create useful, beautiful programs and information resources, and then give them away." A person of moderate zeal might say "Open source is a good thing, which I am willing to spend significant time helping happen". A person of little zeal might say "Yes, open source is OK sometimes. I play with it and respect people who build it".

狂热程度高的人可能会说："自由软件就是我的生命！我的存在就是为了创造有用、优美的程序和信息资源，然后将它们分享出去。" 狂热程度中等的人可能会说："开源是件好事，我愿意花大量时间助力其发展。" 狂热程度较低的人可能会说："嗯，开源有时候还不错。我会用它，也尊重开发它的人。"

Another degree of variation is in hostility to commercial software and/or the companies perceived to dominate the commercial software market.

另一个差异维度是对商业软件以及/或者被认为主导商业软件市场的公司的敌视程度。

A very anticommercial person might say "Commercial software is theft and hoarding. I write free software to end this evil." A moderately anticommercial person might say "Commercial software in general is OK because programmers deserve to get paid, but companies that coast on shoddy products and throw their weight around are evil." An un-anticommercial person might say "Commercial software is OK, I just use and/or write open-source software because I like it better". (Nowadays, given the growth of the open-source part of the industry since the first public version of this paper, one might also hear "Commercial software is fine, as long as I get the source or it does what I want it to do.")

极具反商业倾向的人可能会说："商业软件就是盗窃和囤积。我编写自由软件是为了终结这种邪恶。" 中度反商业倾向的人可能会说："商业软件总体来说是可以接受的，因为程序员理应获得报酬，但那些靠劣质产品混日子、恃强凌弱的公司是邪恶的。" 无反商业倾向的人可能会说："商业软件没什么不好，我只是因为更喜欢才使用和/或编写开源软件。"（如今，自本文首个公开版本发布以来，开源产业部分已有所发展，你可能还会听到这样的说法："商业软件挺好的，只要我能拿到源代码，或者它能满足我的需求就行。"）

All nine of the attitudes implied by the cross-product of the above categories are represented in the open-source culture. The reason it is worthwhile to point out the distinctions is because they imply different agendas, and different adaptive and cooperative behaviors.

上述两个维度交叉组合形成的九种态度，在开源文化中都有体现。指出这些差异是有意义的，因为它们意味着不同的目标以及不同的适应与合作行为。

Historically, the most visible and best-organized part of the hacker culture has been both very zealous and very anticommercial. The Free Software Foundation founded by Richard M. Stallman (RMS) supported a great deal of open-source development from the early 1980s on, including tools like Emacs and GCC which are still basic to the Internet open-source world, and seem likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.

从历史上看，黑客文化中最引人注目、组织最完善的部分，既具有高度的狂热性，也具有强烈的反商业倾向。理查德·M·斯托曼（RMS）创立的自由软件基金会（FSF）自 20 世纪 80 年代初以来，支持了大量开源项目的开发，包括 Emacs 和 GCC 等工具。这些工具至今仍是互联网开源世界的基础，并且在可预见的未来似乎仍将保持这一地位。

For many years the FSF was the single most important focus of open-source hacking, producing a huge number of tools still critical to the culture. The FSF was also long the only sponsor of open source with an institutional identity visible to outside observers of the hacker culture. They effectively defined the term 'free software', deliberately giving it a confrontational weight (which the newer label 'open source' just as deliberately avoids).

多年来，FSF 一直是开源黑客活动最核心的焦点，开发了大量至今对该文化仍至关重要的工具。长期以来，FSF 也是唯一一个在黑客文化外部观察者眼中具有明确机构身份的开源赞助者。他们有效地定义了"自由软件"这一术语，并特意赋予其对抗性的意味（而较新的"开源"标签则刻意避免了这一点）。

Thus, perceptions of the hacker culture from both within and outside it tended to identify the culture with the FSF's zealous attitude and perceived anticommercial aims. RMS himself denies he is anticommercial, but his program has been so read by most people, including many of his most vocal partisans. The FSF's vigorous and explicit drive to "Stamp Out Software Hoarding!" became the closest thing to a hacker ideology, and RMS the closest thing to a leader of the hacker culture.

因此，无论是黑客文化内部还是外部的观察者，都倾向于将该文化与 FSF 的狂热态度及被认为的反商业目标划等号。尽管 RMS 本人否认自己反商业，但他的理念在大多数人（包括许多直言不讳的支持者）看来确实如此。FSF 大力且明确地倡导"杜绝软件囤积！"，这几乎成为了黑客意识形态的代名词，而 RMS 也几乎被视为黑客文化的领袖。

The FSF's license terms, the "General Public License" (GPL), expresses the FSF's attitudes. It is very widely used in the open-source world. North Carolina's Metalab (formerly Sunsite) is the largest and most popular software archive in the Linux world. In July 1997 about half the Sunsite software packages with explicit license terms used GPL.

FSF 的许可条款------"通用公共许可证"（GPL），体现了 FSF 的态度。该许可证在开源世界中应用极为广泛。北卡罗来纳州的 Metalab（前身为 Sunsite）是 Linux 世界中最大、最受欢迎的软件档案库。1997 年 7 月，Sunsite 中约有一半带有明确许可条款的软件包采用了 GPL 协议。

But the FSF was never the only game in town. There was always a quieter, less confrontational and more market-friendly strain in the hacker culture. The pragmatists were loyal not so much to an ideology as to a group of engineering traditions founded on early open-source efforts which predated the FSF. These traditions included, most importantly, the intertwined technical cultures of Unix and the pre-commercial Internet.

但 FSF 并非唯一的参与者。黑客文化中始终存在着一种更为温和、更少对抗性且更亲近市场的流派。实用主义者并非忠于某种意识形态，而是忠于一系列基于 FSF 成立之前早期开源努力形成的工程传统。其中最重要的传统包括 Unix 与商业化前互联网相互交织的技术文化。

The typical pragmatist attitude is only moderately anticommercial, and its major grievance against the corporate world is not 'hoarding' per se. Rather it is that world's perverse refusal to adopt superior approaches incorporating Unix and open standards and open-source software. If the pragmatist hates anything, it is less likely to be 'hoarders' in general than the current King Log of the software establishment; formerly IBM, now Microsoft.

典型的实用主义者态度仅带有中度反商业倾向，他们对企业界的主要不满并非"囤积"本身，而是企业界顽固地拒绝采用融合了 Unix、开放标准和开源软件的更优方案。如果说实用主义者有什么厌恶的对象，那更可能不是一般意义上的"囤积者"，而是软件行业中当前的主导者------过去是 IBM，现在是微软。

To pragmatists, the GPL is important as a tool rather than an end in itself. Its main value is not as a weapon against 'hoarding', but as a tool for encouraging software sharing and the growth of bazaar-mode development communities. The pragmatist values having good tools and toys more than he dislikes commercialism, and may use high-quality commercial software without ideological discomfort. At the same time, his open-source experience has taught him standards of technical quality that very little closed software can meet.

对实用主义者而言，GPL 是一种重要的工具，而非目的本身。其主要价值不在于作为对抗"囤积"的武器，而在于作为鼓励软件共享和集市模式开发社区发展的工具。实用主义者对优质工具和"玩具"的重视，超过了对商业主义的反感，他们可以毫无意识形态顾虑地使用高质量的商业软件。同时，开源经历让他们树立了很高的技术质量标准，而很少有闭源软件能够达到这一标准。

For many years, the pragmatist point of view expressed itself within the hacker culture mainly as a stubborn current of refusal to completely buy into the GPL in particular or the FSF's agenda in general. Through the 1980s and early 1990s, this attitude tended to be associated with fans of Berkeley Unix, users of the BSD license, and the early efforts to build open-source Unixes from the BSD source base. These efforts, however, failed to build bazaar communities of significant size, and became seriously fragmented and ineffective.

多年来，实用主义者的观点在黑客文化中主要表现为一种顽固的倾向：拒绝完全接受 GPL 协议，或总体上拒绝 FSF 的议程。在 20 世纪 80 年代至 90 年代初，这种态度往往与伯克利 Unix 的爱好者、BSD 许可证的使用者，以及早期基于 BSD 源代码构建开源 Unix 系统的努力联系在一起。然而，这些努力未能建立起规模可观的集市模式社区，反而变得严重分裂且效率低下。

Not until the Linux explosion of early 1993-1994 did pragmatism find a real power base. Although Linus Torvalds never made a point of opposing RMS, he set an example by looking benignly on the growth of a commercial Linux industry, by publicly endorsing the use of high-quality commercial software for specific tasks, and by gently deriding the more purist and fanatical elements in the culture.

直到 1993 年初至 1994 年 Linux 爆发式发展，实用主义才找到了真正的权力基础。尽管林纳斯·托瓦兹从未刻意反对 RMS，但他树立了一个榜样：对商业 Linux 产业的发展持宽容态度，公开支持为特定任务使用高质量商业软件，并温和地嘲讽文化中那些更为纯粹和狂热的极端分子。

A side effect of the rapid growth of Linux was the induction of a large number of new hackers for which Linux was their primary loyalty and the FSF's agenda primarily of historical interest. Though the newer wave of Linux hackers might describe the system as "the choice of a GNU generation", most tended to emulate Torvalds more than Stallman.

Linux 的快速发展带来了一个副作用：吸引了大量新黑客，这些新黑客主要忠于 Linux，而 FSF 的议程对他们来说更多只具有历史意义。尽管新一代 Linux 黑客可能会将该系统描述为"GNU 一代的选择"，但大多数人更倾向于效仿托瓦兹而非斯托曼。

Increasingly it was the anticommercial purists who found themselves in a minority. How much things had changed would not become apparent until the Netscape announcement in February 1998 that it would distribute Navigator 5.0 in source. This excited more interest in 'free software' within the corporate world. The subsequent call to the hacker culture to exploit this unprecedented opportunity and to re-label its product from 'free software' to 'open source' was met with a level of instant approval that surprised everybody involved.

反商业的纯粹主义者逐渐沦为少数派。这种变化的程度直到 1998 年 2 月网景（Netscape）宣布将以源代码形式分发 Navigator 5.0 才变得明显。这一消息在企业界引发了对"自由软件"的更多兴趣。随后，有人呼吁黑客文化利用这一前所未有的机遇，将其产品标签从"自由软件"改为"开源软件"，这一呼吁得到了所有相关人士始料未及的即时广泛支持。

In a reinforcing development, the pragmatist part of the culture was itself becoming polycentric by the mid-1990s. Other semi-independent communities with their own self-consciousness and charismatic leaders began to bud from the Unix/Internet root stock. Of these, the most important after Linux was the Perl culture under Larry Wall. Smaller, but still significant, were the traditions building up around John Osterhout's Tcl and Guido van Rossum's Python languages. All three of these communities expressed their ideological independence by devising their own, non-GPL licensing schemes.

另一个推动因素是，到 20 世纪 90 年代中期，文化中的实用主义部分本身也变得多中心。其他具有自身意识和魅力领袖的半独立社区开始从 Unix/互联网这一根基中萌芽。其中，继 Linux 之后最重要的是拉里·沃尔领导下的 Perl 文化。围绕约翰·奥斯特豪特的 Tcl 语言和吉多·范罗苏姆的 Python 语言形成的传统虽规模较小，但仍具有重要意义。这三个社区都通过设计自己的非 GPL 许可方案，表达了其意识形态上的独立性。

3. Promiscuous Theory, Puritan Practice

3. 开放的理论，严谨的实践

Through all these changes, nevertheless, there remained a broad consensus theory of what 'free software' or 'open source' is. The clearest expression of this common theory can be found in the various open-source licenses, all of which have crucial common elements.

然而，尽管发生了这些变化，关于"自由软件"或"开源软件"的定义仍存在广泛的共识性理论。这一共同理论最清晰的体现可见于各种开源许可证中，所有这些许可证都包含关键的共同要素。

In 1997 these common elements were distilled into the Debian Free Software Guidelines, which became the Open Source Definition. Under the guidelines defined by the OSD, an open-source license must protect an unconditional right of any party to modify (and redistribute modified versions of) open-source software.

1997 年，这些共同要素被提炼为《Debian 自由软件指南》，并随后成为《开源定义》（OSD）。根据 OSD 所定义的准则，开源许可证必须保障任何一方拥有无条件修改（并再分发修改版本）开源软件的权利。

Thus, the implicit theory of the OSD (and OSD-conformant licenses such as the GPL, the BSD license, and Perl's Artistic License) is that anyone can hack anything. Nothing prevents half a dozen different people from taking any given open-source product (such as, say the Free Software Foundation's gcc C compiler), duplicating the sources, running off with them in different evolutionary directions, but all claiming to be the product.

因此，OSD（以及符合 OSD 标准的许可证，如 GPL、BSD 许可证和 Perl 的艺术许可证）的隐含理论是：任何人都可以修改任何软件。没有任何规定能阻止六个人分别获取某个开源产品（例如自由软件基金会的 gcc C 语言编译器），复制其源代码，朝着不同的演进方向独立开发，却都声称自己的产品是该软件的正统版本。

In practice, however, such 'forking' almost never happens. Splits in major projects have been rare, and always accompanied by re-labeling and a large volume of public self-justification. It is clear that, in such cases as the GNU Emacs/XEmacs split, or the gcc/egcs split, or the various fissionings of the BSD splinter groups, that the splitters felt they were going against a fairly powerful community norm.

然而在实践中，这种"分支"（forking）几乎从未发生过。大型项目的分裂极为罕见，且分裂时总会伴随重新命名以及大量公开的自我辩护。显然，在 GNU Emacs/XEmacs 分裂、gcc/egcs 分裂以及 BSD 分裂团体的各种内部分裂等案例中，分裂者都清楚自己违背了强大的社区规范。

In fact (and in contradiction to the anyone-can-hack-anything consensus theory) the open-source culture has an elaborate but largely unadmitted set of ownership customs. These customs regulate who can modify software, the circumstances under which it can be modified, and (especially) who has the right to redistribute modified versions back to the community.

事实上（与"任何人都可以修改任何软件"的共识理论相悖），开源文化拥有一套复杂但大多未被公开承认的所有权惯例。这些惯例规范了谁可以修改软件、在何种情况下可以修改软件，以及（尤其是）谁有权将修改后的版本重新分发给社区。

The taboos of a culture throw its norms into sharp relief. Therefore, it will be useful later on if we summarize some important ones here.

一种文化的禁忌能鲜明地凸显其规范。因此，我们在此总结一些重要禁忌，这对后续讨论将有所帮助。

• There is strong social pressure against forking projects. It does not happen except under plea of dire necessity, with much public self-justification, and with a renaming.

  反对项目分支的社会压力极大。除非存在极端必要的理由、经过大量公开自我辩护并进行重新命名，否则绝不会出现分支现象。

• Distributing changes to a project without the cooperation of the moderators is frowned upon, except in special cases like essentially trivial porting fixes.

  未经维护者合作就分发项目修改内容是不受认可的，除非是一些特殊情况，例如基本无需修改的移植修复。

• Removing a person's name from a project history, credits or maintainer list is absolutely not done without the person's explicit consent.

  未经本人明确同意，绝对不能从项目历史记录、致谢名单或维护者列表中删除他人姓名。

In the remainder of this paper, we shall examine these taboos and ownership customs in detail. We shall inquire not only into how they function but what they reveal about the underlying social dynamics and incentive structures of the open-source community.

在本文的后续部分，我们将详细探讨这些禁忌和所有权惯例。我们不仅会探究它们的运作方式，还会分析它们所揭示的开源社区潜在的社会动态和激励结构。

4. Ownership and Open Source

4. 所有权与开源软件

What does 'ownership' mean when property is infinitely reduplicable, highly malleable, and the surrounding culture has neither coercive power relationships nor material scarcity economics?

当财产可以无限复制、高度可塑，且所处文化既无强制性权力关系，也无物质稀缺性经济时，"所有权"意味着什么？

Actually, in the case of the open-source culture this is an easy question to answer. The owner(s) of a software project are those who have the exclusive right, recognized by the community at large, to re-distribute modified versions.

实际上，就开源文化而言，这个问题很容易回答。软件项目的所有者（们）是那些获得社区广泛认可、拥有重新分发修改版本专属权利的人。

(In discussing 'ownership' in this section I will use the singular, as though all projects are owned by some one person. It should be understood, however, that projects may be owned by groups. We shall examine the internal dynamics of such groups later in this paper.)

（本节讨论"所有权"时，我将使用单数形式，仿佛所有项目都归某个人所有。但需明确的是，项目也可能由团体拥有。我们将在本文后续部分探讨此类团体的内部动态。）

According to the standard open-source licenses, all parties are equals in the evolutionary game. But in practice there is a very well-recognized distinction between 'official' patches, approved and integrated into the evolving software by the publicly recognized maintainers, and 'rogue' patches by third parties. Rogue patches are unusual, and generally not trusted.

根据标准的开源许可证，所有各方在软件演进过程中都是平等的。但在实践中，"官方补丁"（由公开认可的维护者批准并整合到正在演进的软件中的补丁）与第三方的"非官方补丁"（rogue patches）之间存在着明确的区别。非官方补丁并不常见，且通常不被信任。

That public redistribution is the fundamental issue is easy to establish. Custom encourages people to patch software for personal use when necessary. Custom is indifferent to people who redistribute modified versions within a closed user or development group. It is only when modifications are posted to the open-source community in general, to compete with the original, that ownership becomes an issue.

公开重新分发是核心问题，这一点很容易证实。惯例鼓励人们在必要时为个人使用而修补软件。对于在封闭用户群或开发小组内部重新分发修改版本的行为，惯例并不干预。只有当修改后的版本被公开发布到整个开源社区，与原版软件竞争时，所有权才成为一个问题。

There are, in general, three ways to acquire ownership of an open-source project. One, the most obvious, is to found the project. When a project has had only one maintainer since its inception and the maintainer is still active, custom does not even permit a question as to who owns the project.

通常，获取开源项目所有权有三种方式。第一种，也是最明显的一种，是创立该项目。如果一个项目自创立以来只有一位维护者，且该维护者仍在积极维护，那么惯例下甚至不会有人质疑该项目的所有权归属。

The second way is to have ownership of the project handed to you by the previous owner (this is sometimes known as 'passing the baton'). It is well understood in the community that project owners have a duty to pass projects to competent successors when they are no longer willing or able to invest needed time in development or maintenance work.

第二种方式是由前任所有者将项目所有权移交予你（这有时被称为"交接接力棒"）。社区中普遍认为，当项目所有者不再愿意或无法投入必要的时间进行开发或维护工作时，他们有责任将项目移交给有能力的继任者。

It is significant that in the case of major projects, such transfers of control are generally announced with some fanfare. While it is unheard of for the open-source community at large to actually interfere in the owner's choice of succession, customary practice clearly incorporates a premise that public legitimacy is important.

值得注意的是，对于大型项目，此类控制权移交通常会大张旗鼓地宣布。尽管开源社区整体从未干预过所有者对继任者的选择，但惯例显然蕴含着一个前提：公开的合法性至关重要。

For minor projects, it is generally sufficient for a change history included with the project distribution to note the change of ownership. The clear presumption is that if the former owner has not in fact voluntarily transferred control, he or she may reassert control with community backing by objecting publicly within a reasonable period of time.

对于小型项目，通常只需在项目分发文件中附带的变更历史中注明所有权变更即可。明确的推定是，如果前任所有者并未实际自愿移交控制权，他或她可以在合理期限内通过公开反对的方式，在社区支持下重新主张控制权。

The third way to acquire ownership of a project is to observe that it needs work and the owner has disappeared or lost interest. If you want to do this, it is your responsibility to make the effort to find the owner. If you don't succeed, then you may announce in a relevant place (such as a Usenet newsgroup dedicated to the application area) that the project appears to be orphaned, and that you are considering taking responsibility for it.

获取项目所有权的第三种方式是，发现某个项目需要维护，但原所有者已失联或失去兴趣。如果想要采取这种方式，你有责任努力寻找原所有者。如果寻找未果，你可以在相关场所（例如专门针对该应用领域的 Usenet 新闻组）宣布该项目似乎已被遗弃，并且你正考虑接手该项目的维护工作。

Custom demands that you allow some time to pass before following up with an announcement that you have declared yourself the new owner. In this interval, if someone else announces that they have been actually working on the project, their claim trumps yours. It is considered good form to give public notice of your intentions more than once. More points for good form if you announce in many relevant forums (related newsgroups, mailing lists); and still more if you show patience in waiting for replies. In general, the more visible effort you make to allow the previous owner or other claimants to respond, the better your claim if no response is forthcoming.

惯例要求，在宣布自己成为新所有者之前，你需要等待一段时间。在这段等待期内，如果有人宣布他们实际上一直在维护该项目，那么他们的主张将优先于你的主张。多次公开告知你的意图被视为一种良好的做法。如果能在多个相关论坛（相关新闻组、邮件列表）中发布通知，将更能体现良好作风；如果能耐心等待回复，则更甚。一般而言，你为让前任所有者或其他主张者有机会回应所做出的努力越公开可见，在无人回应的情况下，你的所有权主张就越有说服力。

If you have gone through this process in sight of the project's user community, and there are no objections, then you may claim ownership of the orphaned project and so note in its history file. This, however, is less secure than being passed the baton, and you cannot expect to be considered fully legitimate until you have made substantial improvements in the sight of the user community.

如果你在项目用户社区的见证下完成了这一过程，且没有遭到反对，那么你就可以主张对该遗弃项目的所有权，并在其历史文件中注明。然而，这种方式获得的所有权不如通过"交接接力棒"获得的所有权稳固，并且在你在用户社区的见证下对项目做出实质性改进之前，你不能期望自己被完全认可为合法所有者。

I have observed these customs in action for twenty years, going back to the pre-FSF ancient history of open-source software. They have several very interesting features. One of the most interesting is that most hackers have followed them without being fully aware of doing so. Indeed, the above may be the first conscious and reasonably complete summary ever to have been written down.

回溯到 FSF 成立之前开源软件的"远古时代"，我观察这些惯例的实际运作已有二十年之久。它们具有几个非常有趣的特点。其中最有趣的一点是，大多数黑客在遵循这些惯例时，自己并未完全意识到。事实上，上述内容可能是有史以来第一个有意识地、相对完整地记录这些惯例的总结。

Another is that, for unconscious customs, they have been followed with remarkable (even astonishing) consistency. I have observed the evolution of literally hundreds of open-source projects, and I can still count the number of significant violations I have observed or heard about on my fingers.

另一个特点是，作为无意识的惯例，它们被遵循的一致性令人瞩目（甚至令人惊讶）。我亲眼目睹了数百个开源项目的演进过程，但我所观察到或听说过的严重违反这些惯例的案例屈指可数。

Yet a third interesting feature is that as these customs have evolved over time, they have done so in a consistent direction. That direction has been to encourage more public accountability, more public notice, and more care about preserving the credits and change histories of projects in ways which (among other things) establish the legitimacy of the present owners.

第三个有趣的特点是，这些惯例随着时间的推移不断演进，且演进方向始终一致。这一方向是鼓励更高程度的公开问责、更充分的公开告知，以及更注重通过保护项目的致谢信息和变更历史（除其他目的外）来确立当前所有者的合法性。

These features suggest that the customs are not accidental, but are products of some kind of implicit agenda or generative pattern in the open-source culture that is utterly fundamental to the way it operates.

这些特点表明，这些惯例并非偶然形成，而是开源文化中某种隐含议程或生成模式的产物，这种模式对开源文化的运作方式至关重要。

An early respondent pointed out that contrasting the Internet hacker culture with the cracker/pirate culture (the "warez d00dz" centered around game-cracking and pirate bulletin-board systems) illuminates the generative patterns of both rather well. We'll return to the d00dz for contrast later in the paper.

一位早期的反馈者指出，将互联网黑客文化与破解者/海盗文化（围绕游戏破解和盗版公告板系统的"软件盗版者群体"）进行对比，能很好地揭示两者的生成模式。我们将在本文后续部分再次提及该群体，以作对比。

5. Locke and Land Title

5. 洛克与土地所有权

To understand this generative pattern, it helps to notice a historical analogy for these customs that is far outside the domain of hackers' usual concerns. As students of legal history and political philosophy may recognize, the theory of property they imply is virtually identical to the Anglo-American common-law theory of land tenure!

要理解这种生成模式，我们可以关注一个与这些惯例相关的历史类比，而这一类比超出了黑客通常关注的领域。法律史和政治哲学专业的学生可能会发现，这些惯例所蕴含的产权理论，与英美普通法中的土地所有权理论几乎完全一致！

In this theory, there are three ways to acquire ownership of land.

在这一理论中，获取土地所有权有三种方式。

On a frontier, where land exists that has never had an owner, one can acquire ownership by homesteading, mixing one's labor with the unowned land, fencing it, and defending one's title.

在边境地区，对于从未有过所有者的土地，个人可以通过"宅地法原则"（homesteading）获取所有权：将自己的劳动与无主土地相结合，划定边界，并维护自己的所有权。

The usual means of transfer in settled areas is transfer of title -- that is, receiving the deed from the previous owner. In this theory, the concept of 'chain of title' is important. The ideal proof of ownership is a chain of deeds and transfers extending back to when the land was originally homesteaded.

在已定居地区，所有权转移的通常方式是产权转让------即从前任所有者手中获得契据。在这一理论中，"产权链"（chain of title）的概念至关重要。最理想的所有权证明是一系列契据和转让记录，可追溯至该土地最初被开垦为宅地之时。

Finally, the common-law theory recognizes that land title may be lost or abandoned (for example, if the owner dies without heirs, or the records needed to establish chain of title to vacant land are gone). A piece of land that has become derelict in this way may be claimed by adverse possession -- one moves in, improves it, and defends title as if homesteading.

最后，普通法理论承认，土地所有权可能会丧失或被遗弃（例如，所有者去世后无继承人，或者证明闲置土地产权链所需的记录丢失）。对于以这种方式被遗弃的土地，个人可以通过"反向占有"（adverse possession）主张所有权：入住该土地，对其进行改良，并像通过宅地法原则获取所有权那样维护自己的产权。

This theory, like hacker customs, evolved organically in a context where central authority was weak or nonexistent. It developed over a period of a thousand years from Norse and Germanic tribal law. Because it was systematized and rationalized in the early modern era by the English political philosopher John Locke, it is sometimes referred to as the 'Lockean' theory of property.

与黑客惯例一样，这一理论是在中央权力薄弱或不存在的环境中有机演进而来的。它源于北欧和日耳曼部落法，历经千年发展。由于英国政治哲学家约翰·洛克在近代早期对其进行了系统化和理论化，因此它有时被称为"洛克式"产权理论。

Logically similar theories have tended to evolve wherever property has high economic or survival value and no single authority is powerful enough to force central allocation of scarce goods. This is true even in the hunter-gatherer cultures that are sometimes romantically thought to have no concept of 'property'. For example, in the traditions of the !Kung San bushmen of the Kgalagadi (formerly 'Kalahari') Desert, there is no ownership of hunting grounds. But there is ownership of water-holes and springs under a theory recognizably akin to Locke's.

在任何财产具有很高经济价值或生存价值，且没有任何单一权威有足够力量强制对稀缺资源进行集中分配的地方，逻辑上类似的理论往往会应运而生。即使在那些有时被理想化地认为没有"财产"概念的狩猎采集文化中，情况也是如此。例如，在卡拉哈里沙漠（现称卡拉哈迪沙漠）的昆桑布须曼人的传统中，狩猎场没有所有权，但水坑和泉水的所有权遵循着一种明显与洛克理论相似的原则。

The !Kung San example is instructive, because it shows that Lockean property customs arise only where the expected return from the resource exceeds the expected cost of defending it. Hunting grounds are not property because the return from hunting is highly unpredictable and variable, and (although highly prized) not a necessity for day-to-day survival. Waterholes, on the other hand, are vital to survival and small enough to defend.

昆桑人的例子很有启发意义，因为它表明，洛克式产权惯例只会在资源的预期回报超过维护其所有权的预期成本时才会出现。狩猎场不被视为财产，因为狩猎的回报极具不可预测性和波动性，而且（尽管价值很高）并非日常生存的必需品。而水坑则对生存至关重要，且规模足够小，便于守护。

The 'noosphere' of this essay's title is the territory of ideas, the space of all possible thoughts. What we see implied in hacker ownership customs is a Lockean theory of property rights in one subset of the noosphere, the space of all programs. Hence 'homesteading the noosphere', which is what every founder of a new open-source project does.

本文标题中的"智域"（noosphere）指的是思想的领域，即所有可能的思想所构成的空间。我们在黑客所有权惯例中所看到的隐含逻辑，是智域中一个子集（即所有程序所构成的空间）的洛克式产权理论。因此，"智域拓荒"（homesteading the noosphere）正是每个新开源项目创始人所做的事情。

Faré Rideau (fare@tunes.org) correctly points out that hackers do not exactly operate in the territory of pure ideas. He asserts that what hackers own is programming projects -- intensional focus points of material labor (development, service, etc), to which are associated things like reputation, trustworthiness, etc. He therefore asserts that the space spanned by hacker projects, is not the noosphere but a sort of dual of it, the space of noosphere-exploring program projects. (With an apologetic nod to the astrophysicists out there, it would be etymologically correct to call this dual space the 'ergosphere' or 'sphere of work'.)

法尔·里多（fare@tunes.org）正确地指出，黑客并非完全在纯粹的思想领域活动。他认为，黑客所拥有的是编程项目------这些项目是物质劳动（开发、服务等）的内涵焦点，与声誉、可信度等因素相关联。因此，他主张，黑客项目所跨越的空间并非智域，而是智域的某种对偶空间，即探索智域的程序项目所构成的空间。（在此向天体物理学家们致歉，从词源学角度来看，将这个对偶空间称为"功域"（ergosphere）或"工作领域"是恰当的。）

In practice, the distinction between noosphere and ergosphere is not important for the purposes of this paper. It is dubious whether the 'noosphere' in the pure sense Faré insists on can be said to exist in any meaningful way; one would almost have to be a Platonist philosopher to believe in it. And the distinction between noosphere and ergosphere is only of practical importance if one wishes to assert that ideas (the elements of the noosphere) cannot be owned, but their instantiations as projects can. This question leads to issues in the theory of intellectual property which are beyond the scope of this paper.

在实践中，对于本文的研究目的而言，智域与功域的区分并不重要。法尔所坚持的纯粹意义上的"智域"是否能以任何有意义的方式存在，这一点是值得怀疑的；只有柏拉图主义哲学家才可能相信它的存在。而且，只有当有人主张思想（智域的元素）不能被拥有，但其作为项目的具体体现可以被拥有时，智域与功域的区分才具有实际意义。这一问题涉及知识产权理论的相关议题，超出了本文的讨论范围。

To avoid confusion, however, it is important to note that neither the noosphere nor the ergosphere is the same as the totality of virtual locations in electronic media that is sometimes (to the disgust of most hackers) called 'cyberspace'. Property there is regulated by completely different rules that are closer to those of the material substratum -- essentially, he who owns the media and machines on which a part of 'cyberspace' is hosted owns that piece of cyberspace as a result.

然而，为避免混淆，需要明确的是，无论是智域还是功域，都不同于电子媒体中所有虚拟位置的总和------这些虚拟位置有时（令大多数黑客反感）被称为"赛博空间"（cyberspace）。赛博空间中的财产受完全不同的规则约束，这些规则更接近物质底层的规则------本质上，谁拥有承载某部分"赛博空间"的媒体和机器，谁就拥有该部分赛博空间。

The Lockean logic of custom suggests strongly that open-source hackers observe the customs they do in order to defend some kind of expected return from their effort. The return must be more significant than the effort of homesteading projects, the cost of maintaining version histories that document 'chain of title', and the time cost of doing public notifications and a waiting period before taking adverse possession of an orphaned project.

惯例背后的洛克式逻辑强烈表明，开源黑客遵循这些惯例是为了保障自己的努力能获得某种预期回报。这种回报必须足够显著，以弥补项目拓荒的努力、维护记录"产权链"的版本历史的成本，以及在反向占有遗弃项目之前进行公开通知和等待的时间成本。

Furthermore, the 'yield' from open source must be something more than simply the use of the software, something else that would be compromised or diluted by forking. If use were the only issue, there would be no taboo against forking, and open-source ownership would not resemble land tenure at all. In fact, this alternate world (where use is the only yield, and forking is unproblematic) is the one implied by existing open-source licenses.

此外，开源带来的"回报"必须不仅仅是软件的使用权，还应包括某种会因分支而受损或被稀释的东西。如果仅涉及使用权，那么就不会有反对分支的禁忌，开源所有权也根本不会与土地所有权有任何相似之处。事实上，现有开源许可证所隐含的正是这样一个替代场景------在该场景中，使用权是唯一的回报，分支也不会带来任何问题。

We can eliminate some candidate kinds of yield right away. Because you can't coerce effectively over a network connection, seeking power is right out. Likewise, the open-source culture doesn't have anything much resembling money or an internal scarcity economy, so hackers cannot be pursuing anything very closely analogous to material wealth (e.g. the accumulation of scarcity tokens).

我们可以立即排除一些可能的回报类型。由于无法通过网络连接有效施加胁迫，追求权力是不可能的。同样，开源文化中没有任何类似货币的东西，也没有内部的稀缺性经济，因此黑客不可能追求任何与物质财富非常相似的东西（例如稀缺代币的积累）。

There is one way that open-source activity can help people become wealthier, however -- a way that provides a valuable clue to what actually motivates it. Occasionally, the reputation one gains in the hacker culture can spill over into the real world in economically significant ways. It can get you a better job offer, or a consulting contract, or a book deal.

然而，开源活动有一种方式可以帮助人们变得更富有------这种方式为我们揭示开源的真正动机提供了宝贵线索。有时，一个人在黑客文化中获得的声誉会以具有经济意义的方式延伸到现实世界中。它可能会为你带来更好的工作机会、咨询合同或图书出版协议。

This kind of side effect, however, is at best rare and marginal for most hackers; far too much so to make it convincing as a sole explanation, even if we ignore the repeated protestations by hackers that they're doing what they do not for money but out of idealism or love.

然而，对于大多数黑客来说，这种副作用充其量是罕见且次要的；即便我们忽略黑客们反复强调的"他们做这些并非为了钱，而是出于理想主义或热爱"，这种副作用也远远不足以作为唯一的解释。

However, the way such economic side-effects are mediated is worth examination. Below we'll see that an understanding of the dynamics of reputation within the open-source culture itself has considerable explanatory power.

不过，这种经济副作用的产生机制值得探究。下文我们将看到，理解开源文化内部的声誉动态具有相当强的解释力。

6. The Hacker Milieu as Gift Culture

6. 作为礼物文化的黑客环境

To understand the role of reputation in the open-source culture, it is helpful to move from history further into anthropology and economics, and examine the difference between exchange cultures and gift cultures.

要理解声誉在开源文化中的作用，我们可以从历史进一步转向人类学和经济学，探讨交换文化与礼物文化之间的差异。

Human beings have an innate drive to compete for social status; it's wired in by our evolutionary history. For the 90% of that history that ran before the invention of agriculture, our ancestors lived in small nomadic hunting-gathering bands. High-status individuals (those most effective at forming coalitions and persuading others to cooperate with them) got the healthiest mates and access to the best food. This drive for status expresses itself in different ways, depending largely on the degree of scarcity of survival goods.

人类天生具有争夺社会地位的驱动力；这是我们进化历史所决定的。在农业发明之前的 90% 的人类历史中，我们的祖先生活在小型游牧狩猎采集群体中。地位高的人（那些最善于组建联盟并说服他人合作的人）能获得最健康的配偶和最好的食物。这种对地位的追求会以不同方式表现出来，很大程度上取决于生存物资的稀缺程度。

Most ways humans have of organizing are adaptations to scarcity and want. Each way carries with it different ways of gaining social status.

人类大多数的组织方式都是对稀缺和匮乏的适应。每种组织方式都对应着不同的获取社会地位的途径。

The simplest way is the command hierarchy. In command hierarchies, allocation of scarce goods is done by one central authority and backed up by force. Command hierarchies scale very poorly; they become increasingly brutal and inefficient as they get larger. For this reason, command hierarchies above the size of an extended family are almost always parasites on a larger economy of a different type. In command hierarchies, social status is primarily determined by access to coercive power.

最简单的方式是命令层级制。在命令层级制中，稀缺物资的分配由一个中央权威机构决定，并以强制力为后盾。命令层级制的扩展性很差；随着规模扩大，它们会变得越来越残酷和低效。因此，超出大家庭规模的命令层级制几乎总是依附于更大规模的、不同类型的经济体系。在命令层级制中，社会地位主要由获取强制权力的能力决定。

Our society is predominantly an exchange economy. This is a sophisticated adaptation to scarcity that, unlike the command model, scales quite well. Allocation of scarce goods is done in a decentralized way through trade and voluntary cooperation (and in fact, the dominating effect of competitive desire is to produce cooperative behavior). In an exchange economy, social status is primarily determined by having control of things (not necessarily material things) to use or trade.

我们的社会主要是一种交换经济。这是对稀缺性的复杂适应，与命令模式不同，它具有很好的扩展性。稀缺物资的分配通过贸易和自愿合作以去中心化的方式进行（事实上，竞争欲望的主导作用是促成合作行为）。在交换经济中，社会地位主要由对可使用或可交易之物（不一定是物质之物）的控制权决定。

Most people have implicit mental models for both of the above, and how they interact with each other. Government, the military, and organized crime (for example) are command hierarchies parasitic on the broader exchange economy we call 'the free market'. There's a third model, however, that is radically different from either and not generally recognized except by anthropologists; the gift culture.

大多数人对上述两种模式及其相互作用都有隐含的认知模型。例如，政府、军队和有组织犯罪都是依附于我们称之为"自由市场"的更广泛交换经济的命令层级制。然而，还有第三种模式，它与前两种模式截然不同，除人类学家外，并未被广泛认可------即礼物文化。

Gift cultures are adaptations not to scarcity but to abundance. They arise in populations that do not have significant material-scarcity problems with survival goods. We can observe gift cultures in action among aboriginal cultures living in ecozones with mild climates and abundant food. We can also observe them in certain strata of our own society, especially in show business and among the very wealthy.

礼物文化并非对稀缺性的适应，而是对富足的适应。它出现在那些生存物资不存在严重物质稀缺问题的群体中。我们可以在生活在气候温和、食物充足的生态区的原住民文化中观察到礼物文化的实践。在我们自己社会的某些阶层中，尤其是在娱乐行业和极富有的人群中，也能观察到礼物文化。

Abundance makes command relationships difficult to sustain and exchange relationships an almost pointless game. In gift cultures, social status is determined not by what you control but by what you give away.

富足使得命令关系难以维持，交换关系也几乎变成毫无意义的游戏。在礼物文化中，社会地位不是由你所控制的东西决定的，而是由你所给予的东西决定的。

Thus the Kwakiutl chieftain's potlach party. Thus the multi-millionaire's elaborate and usually public acts of philanthropy. And thus the hacker's long hours of effort to produce high-quality open-source code.

夸扣特尔族酋长的"散财宴"（potlach）就是如此。百万富翁精心策划且通常公开的慈善行为也是如此。黑客花费大量时间编写高质量开源代码的行为同样如此。

For examined in this way, it is quite clear that the society of open-source hackers is in fact a gift culture. Within it, there is no serious shortage of the 'survival necessities' -- disk space, network bandwidth, computing power. Software is freely shared. This abundance creates a situation in which the only available measure of competitive success is reputation among one's peers.

从这个角度来看，开源黑客群体实际上是一种礼物文化，这一点非常明确。在该文化中，"生存必需品"------磁盘空间、网络带宽、计算能力------并不存在严重短缺。软件可以自由共享。这种富足造就了一种局面：竞争成功的唯一可用衡量标准是同行中的声誉。

This observation is not in itself entirely sufficient to explain the observed features of hacker culture, however. The crackers and warez d00dz have a gift culture that thrives in the same (electronic) media as that of the hackers, but their behavior is very different. The group mentality in their culture is much stronger and more exclusive than among hackers. They hoard secrets rather than sharing them; one is much more likely to find cracker groups distributing sourceless executables that crack software than tips that give away how they did it.

然而，这一观察本身并不足以完全解释黑客文化的所有观察特征。破解者和软件盗版者群体也有一种礼物文化，这种文化与黑客文化在相同的（电子）媒体中繁荣发展，但他们的行为却大相径庭。他们文化中的群体意识比黑客群体强烈得多，也更具排他性。他们囤积秘密而非分享；你更有可能发现破解者群体分发破解软件的无源代码可执行文件，而不是透露他们破解方法的技巧。

What this shows, in case it wasn't obvious, is that there is more than one way to run a gift culture. History and values matter. I have summarized the history of the hacker culture in A Brief History of Hackerdom; the ways in which it shaped present behavior are not mysterious. Hackers have defined their culture by a set of choices about the form which their competition will take. It is that form which we will examine in the remainder of this paper.

这表明（如果这一点尚不明显的话），礼物文化的运作方式不止一种。历史和价值观至关重要。我在《黑客文化简史》（A Brief History of Hackerdom）中总结了黑客文化的历史；它塑造当前行为的方式并不神秘。黑客通过一系列关于竞争形式的选择来定义自己的文化。我们将在本文的后续部分探讨这种竞争形式。

7. The Joy of Hacking

7. 黑客的乐趣

In making this 'reputation game' analysis, by the way, I do not mean to devalue or ignore the pure artistic satisfaction of designing beautiful software and making it work. We all experience this kind of satisfaction and thrive on it. People for whom it is not a significant motivation never become hackers in the first place, just as people who don't love music never become composers.

顺便说一句，在进行这种"声誉游戏"分析时，我并非有意贬低或忽视设计优美软件并使其正常运行所带来的纯粹艺术满足感。我们都能体验到这种满足感，并从中获得成长。那些不将这种满足感作为重要动机的人，一开始就不会成为黑客，就像不热爱音乐的人永远不会成为作曲家一样。

So perhaps we should consider another model of hacker behavior in which the pure joy of craftsmanship is the primary motivation. This 'craftsmanship' model would have to explain hacker custom as a way of maximizing both the opportunities for craftsmanship and the quality of the results. Does this conflict with or suggest different results than the 'reputation game' model?

因此，我们或许应该考虑另一种黑客行为模型，在这种模型中，纯粹的技艺乐趣是主要动机。这种"技艺模型"必须将黑客惯例解释为一种既能最大化技艺实践机会，又能最大化结果质量的方式。它与"声誉游戏"模型是否冲突，或者是否会得出不同的结论？

Not really. In examining the 'craftsmanship' model, we come back to the same problems that constrain hackerdom to operate like a gift culture. How can one maximize quality if there is no metric for quality? If scarcity economics doesn't operate, what metrics are available besides peer evaluation? It appears that any craftsmanship culture ultimately must structure itself through a reputation game -- and, in fact, we can observe exactly this dynamic in many historical craftsmanship cultures from the medieval guilds onwards.

其实并不冲突。在考察"技艺模型"时，我们会回到那些限制黑客群体以礼物文化形式运作的相同问题上。如果没有质量衡量标准，如何能最大化质量？如果稀缺性经济不发挥作用，除了同行评价之外，还有什么可用的衡量标准？看来，任何技艺文化最终都必须通过声誉游戏来构建自身------事实上，从 medieval 行会开始的许多历史技艺文化中，我们都能观察到这种动态。

In one important respect, the 'craftsmanship' model is weaker than the 'gift culture' model; by itself, it doesn't help explain the contradiction we began this paper with.

在一个重要方面，"技艺模型"比"礼物文化模型"更弱；它本身无法帮助我们解释本文开篇所提出的矛盾。

Finally, the 'craftsmanship' motivation itself may not be psychologically as far removed from the reputation game as we might like to assume. Imagine your beautiful program locked up in a drawer and never used again. Now imagine it being used effectively and with pleasure by many people. Which dream gives you satisfaction?

最后，从心理学角度来看，"技艺"动机本身可能并不像我们所假设的那样与声誉游戏相距甚远。想象一下，你编写的优美程序被锁在抽屉里，再也无人使用。再想象一下，它被许多人有效且愉快地使用着。哪种场景能给你带来满足感？

Nevertheless, we'll keep an eye on the craftsmanship model. It is intuitively appealing to many hackers, and explains some aspects of individual behavior well enough.

尽管如此，我们仍会关注技艺模型。它对许多黑客具有直观的吸引力，并且能很好地解释个体行为的某些方面。

After I published the first version of this paper on the Internet, an anonymous respondent commented: "You may not work to get reputation, but the reputation is a real payment with consequences if you do the job well." This is a subtle and important point. The reputation incentives continue to operate whether or not a craftsman is aware of them; thus, ultimately, whether or not a hacker understands his own behavior as part of the reputation game, his behavior will be shaped by that game.

我将本文的首个版本发布到互联网后，一位匿名反馈者评论道："你可能并非为了获取声誉而工作，但如果你把工作做好，声誉就是一种真实的回报，会带来实实在在的结果。" 这是一个微妙而重要的观点。无论工匠是否意识到，声誉激励都在发挥作用；因此，归根结底，无论黑客是否将自己的行为理解为声誉游戏的一部分，他的行为都会受到该游戏的影响。

Other respondents related peer-esteem rewards and the joy of hacking to the levels above subsistence needs in Abraham Maslow's well-known 'hierarchy of values' model of human motivation. On this view, the joy of hacking is a self-actualization or transcendence need which will not be consistently expressed until lower-level needs (including those for physical security and for 'belongingness' or peer esteem) have been at least minimally satisfied. Thus, the reputation game may be critical in providing a social context within which the joy of hacking can in fact become the individual's primary motive.

其他反馈者将同行尊重的回报和黑客的乐趣，与亚伯拉罕·马斯洛著名的人类动机"价值观层次"模型中超越生存需求的层次联系起来。根据这一观点，黑客的乐趣是一种自我实现或超越性需求，只有在较低层次的需求（包括人身安全需求、归属感或同行尊重需求）至少得到最低程度的满足后，这种需求才能持续表现出来。因此，声誉游戏可能至关重要，它能提供一种社会环境，在这种环境中，黑客的乐趣实际上可以成为个体的主要动机。

8. The Many Faces of Reputation

8. 声誉的多重面向

There are reasons general to every gift culture why peer repute (prestige) is worth playing for:

在任何礼物文化中，同行声誉（声望）都值得追求，这有一些普遍原因：

First and most obviously, good reputation among one's peers is a primary reward. We're wired to experience it that way for evolutionary reasons touched on earlier. (Many people learn to redirect their drive for prestige into various sublimations that have no obvious connection to a visible peer group, such as "honor", "ethical integrity", "piety" etc.; this does not change the underlying mechanism.)

首先，也是最明显的一点，同行中的良好声誉是一种主要回报。出于前面提到的进化原因，我们天生就会这样感知。（许多人学会将自己对声望的追求转化为各种升华形式，这些形式与可见的同行群体没有明显联系，例如"荣誉""道德正直""虔诚"等；但这并不会改变其底层机制。）

Secondly, prestige is a good way (and in a pure gift economy, the only way) to attract attention and cooperation from others. If one is well known for generosity, intelligence, fair dealing, leadership ability, or other good qualities, it becomes much easier to persuade other people that they will gain by association with you.

其次，声望是吸引他人关注和合作的好方式（在纯粹的礼物经济中，更是唯一的方式）。如果你因慷慨、聪慧、公平交易、领导能力或其他优良品质而闻名，那么说服他人相信与你合作会有所收获就会容易得多。

Thirdly, if your gift economy is in contact with or intertwined with an exchange economy or a command hierarchy, your reputation may spill over and earn you higher status there.

第三，如果你的礼物经济与交换经济或命令层级制有所接触或相互交织，你的声誉可能会延伸到这些领域，并为你赢得更高的地位。

Beyond these general reasons, the peculiar conditions of the hacker culture make prestige even more valuable than it would be in a 'real world' gift culture.

除了这些普遍原因外，黑客文化的特殊环境使得声望比在"现实世界"的礼物文化中更有价值。

The main 'peculiar condition' is that the artifacts one gives away (or, interpreted another way, are the visible sign of one's gift of energy and time) are very complex. Their value is nowhere near as obvious as that of material gifts or exchange-economy money. It is much harder to objectively distinguish a fine gift from a poor one. Accordingly, the success of a giver's bid for status is delicately dependent on the critical judgement of peers.

主要的"特殊环境"是，一个人所赠送的物品（或者换一种解释，是其奉献时间和精力的可见标志）非常复杂。它们的价值远不如物质礼物或交换经济中的货币那样明显。客观区分一件优良礼物和一件劣质礼物要困难得多。因此，赠送者能否成功获得地位，微妙地取决于同行的批判性判断。

Another peculiarity is the relative purity of the open-source culture. Most gift cultures are compromised -- either by exchange-economy relationships such as trade in luxury goods, or by command-economy relationships such as family or clan groupings. No significant analogues of these exist in the open-source culture; thus, ways of gaining status other than by peer repute are virtually absent.

另一个特殊性是开源文化的相对纯粹性。大多数礼物文化都存在妥协------要么受到交换经济关系（如奢侈品贸易）的影响，要么受到命令经济关系（如家庭或宗族群体）的影响。开源文化中不存在这些因素的显著类似物；因此，除了通过同行声誉外，几乎没有其他获取地位的方式。

9. Ownership Rights and Reputation Incentives

9. 所有权与声誉激励

We are now in a position to pull together the previous analyses into a coherent account of hacker ownership customs. We understand the yield from homesteading the noosphere now; it is peer repute in the gift culture of hackers, with all the secondary gains and side-effects that implies.

现在，我们可以将前面的分析整合起来，对黑客所有权惯例进行连贯的解释。我们现在明白了智域拓荒的回报是什么：它是黑客礼物文化中的同行声誉，以及由此带来的所有次要收益和副作用。

From this understanding, we can analyze the Lockean property customs of hackerdom as a means of maximizing reputation incentives; of ensuring that peer credit goes where it is due and does not go where it is not due.

基于这一理解，我们可以将黑客群体的洛克式产权惯例分析为一种最大化声誉激励的手段；确保同行的认可归于应得之人，而不归于不应得之人。

The three taboos we observed above make perfect sense under this analysis. One's reputation can suffer unfairly if someone else misappropriates or mangles one's work; these taboos (and related customs) attempt to prevent this from happening. (Or, to put it more pragmatically, hackers generally refrain from forking or rogue-patching others projects in order to be able to deny legitimacy to the same behavior practiced against themselves.)

我们前面观察到的三个禁忌，在这一分析下完全合理。如果他人盗用或破坏自己的作品，个人的声誉可能会受到不公平的损害；这些禁忌（以及相关惯例）试图防止这种情况发生。（或者更务实地说，黑客通常会避免对他人的项目进行分支或发布非官方补丁，以便能够否认针对自己的类似行为的合法性。）

Forking projects is bad because it exposes pre-fork contributors to a reputation risk they can only control by being active in both child projects simultaneously after the fork. (This would generally be too confusing or difficult to be practical.)

项目分支是有害的，因为它会让分支前的贡献者面临声誉风险，而他们只有在分支后同时活跃于两个子项目中才能控制这种风险。（这通常过于混乱或困难，不具备可行性。）

Distributing rogue patches (or, much worse, rogue binaries) exposes the owners to an unfair reputation risk. Even if the official code is perfect, the owners will catch flak from bugs in the patches.

分发非官方补丁（或者更糟糕的，非官方二进制文件）会让项目所有者面临不公平的声誉风险。即使官方代码是完美的，所有者也会因补丁中的漏洞而受到指责。

Surreptitiously filing someone's name off a project is, in cultural context, one of the ultimate crimes. It steals the victim's gift to be presented as the thief's own.

在文化语境中，偷偷从项目中删除他人姓名是最严重的罪行之一。它窃取了受害者的礼物，并将其冒充为窃贼自己的礼物。

Of course, forking a project or distributing rogue patches for it also directly attacks the reputation of the original developer's group. If I fork or rogue-patch your project, I am saying: "you made a wrong decision [by failing to take the project where I am taking it]"; and Anyone who uses my forked variation is endorsing this challenge. But this in itself would be a fair challenge, albeit extreme; it's the sharpest end of peer review. It's therefore not sufficient in itself to account for the taboos, though it doubtless contributes force to them.

当然，对项目进行分支或分发非官方补丁，也会直接攻击原始开发团队的声誉。如果我对你的项目进行分支或发布非官方补丁，我实际上是在说："你做出了错误的决定（因为你没有将项目引向我所选择的方向）"；而任何使用我分支版本的人，都是在支持这一挑战。但这本身是一种公平的挑战，尽管有些极端；它是同行评审最尖锐的形式。因此，这本身并不足以解释这些禁忌，尽管它无疑增强了禁忌的力度。

All three of these taboo behaviors inflict global harm on the open-source community as well as local harm on the victim(s). Implicitly they damage the entire community by decreasing each potential contributor's perceived likelihood that gift/productive behavior will be rewarded.

这三种禁忌行为不仅会对受害者造成局部伤害，还会对整个开源社区造成整体伤害。它们通过降低每个潜在贡献者对"礼物/生产性行为会获得回报"的感知概率，含蓄地损害了整个社区。

It's important to note that there are alternate candidate explanations for two of these three taboos.

值得注意的是，这三个禁忌中的两个存在其他可能的解释。

First, hackers often explain their antipathy to forking projects by bemoaning the wasteful duplication of work it would imply as the child products evolved in more-or-less parallel into the future. They may also observe that forking tends to split the co-developer community, leaving both child projects with fewer brains to work with than the parent.

首先，黑客们经常解释他们对项目分支的反感，他们哀叹，随着子产品在未来或多或少地并行演进，这将意味着工作的浪费性重复。他们还可能指出，分支往往会分裂联合开发社区，导致两个子项目的可用人才都比母项目少。

A respondent has pointed out that it is unusual for more than one offspring of a fork to survive with significant 'market share' into the long term. This strengthens the incentives for all parties to cooperate and avoid forking, because it's hard to know in advance who will be on the losing side and see a lot of their work either disappear entirely or languish in obscurity.

一位反馈者指出，从长期来看，一个分支的多个衍生项目中，很少有超过一个能保留可观"市场份额"并持续存在。这强化了所有相关方合作避免分支的激励------因为提前很难判断谁会成为失败者，导致大量工作要么彻底消失，要么默默无闻。

Dislike of rogue patches is often explained by observing that they can complicate bug-tracking enormously, and inflict work on maintainers who have quite enough to do catching their own mistakes.

人们对非官方补丁的反感，通常可以这样解释：它们会极大地复杂化漏洞追踪工作，并给维护者增加额外负担------维护者本身已经要花大量精力排查自己的错误。

There is considerable truth to these explanations, and they certainly do their bit to reinforce the Lockean logic of ownership. But while intellectually attractive, they fail to explain why so much emotion and territoriality gets displayed on the infrequent occasions that the taboos get bent or broken -- not just by the injured parties, but by bystanders and observers who often react quite harshly. Cold-blooded concerns about duplication of work and maintenance hassles simply do not sufficiently explain the observed behavior.

这些解释有相当的合理性，也确实在一定程度上强化了所有权的洛克式逻辑。但尽管在理论上具有吸引力，它们却无法解释：为何在少数禁忌被违背或打破的情况下，会引发如此强烈的情绪反应和领地意识------不仅受害者会有强烈反应，旁观者和观察者也常常反应激烈。仅靠对工作重复和维护麻烦的冷静担忧，根本不足以解释这种观察到的行为。

Then, too, there is the third taboo. It's hard to see how anything but the reputation-game analysis can explain this. The fact that this taboo is seldom analyzed much more deeply than "It wouldn't be fair" is revealing in its own way, as we shall see in the next section.

此外，还有第三个禁忌。除了声誉游戏理论，很难找到其他合理的解释。这一禁忌很少被深入分析，人们通常只说"这不公平"------这一事实本身就很有启发意义，我们将在下一节详细探讨。

10. The Problem of Ego

10. 自我（Ego）的问题

At the beginning of the paper I mentioned that the unconscious adaptive knowledge of a culture is often at odds with its conscious ideology. We've seen one major example of this already in the fact that Lockean ownership customs have been widely followed despite the fact that they violate the stated intent of the standard licenses.

本文开篇我提到，一种文化的无意识适应性认知往往与其有意识的意识形态相冲突。我们已经看到一个主要例子：尽管洛克式所有权惯例违背了标准许可证的明确意图，但它们仍被广泛遵循。

I have observed another interesting example of this phenomenon when discussing the reputation-game analysis with hackers. This is that many hackers resisted the analysis and showed a strong reluctance to admit that their behavior was motivated by a desire for peer repute or, as I incautiously labeled it at the time, 'ego satisfaction'.

在与黑客讨论声誉游戏分析时，我观察到了这一现象的另一个有趣例子：许多黑客抵制这种分析，极不情愿承认自己的行为是受追求同行声誉的驱动------或者说，是受我当时不够谨慎所描述的"自我满足"驱动。

This illustrates an interesting point about the hacker culture. It consciously distrusts and despises egotism and ego-based motivations; Self-promotion tends to be mercilessly criticized, even when the community might appear to have something to gain from it. So much so, in fact, that the culture's 'big men' and tribal elders are required to talk softly and humorously deprecate themselves at every turn in order to maintain their status. How this attitude meshes with an incentive structure that apparently runs almost entirely on ego cries out for explanation.

这揭示了黑客文化的一个有趣特点：它有意识地不信任并鄙视利己主义和基于自我的动机。自我推销往往会受到无情批评，即便这种行为看似能给社区带来好处。事实上，该文化中的"大人物"和资深前辈必须说话温和，并不时幽默地自我贬低，才能维持自己的地位。这种态度与显然几乎完全依赖自我驱动的激励结构如何协调，亟需解释。

A large part of it, certainly, stems from the generally negative Europo-American attitude towards 'ego'. The cultural matrix of most hackers teaches them that desiring ego satisfaction is a bad (or at least immature) motivation; that ego is at best an eccentricity tolerable only in prima-donnas and often an actual sign of mental pathology. Only sublimated and disguised forms like "peer repute", "self-esteem", "professionalism" or "pride of accomplishment" are generally acceptable.

当然，这在很大程度上源于欧美文化对"自我"（ego）的普遍负面态度。大多数黑客所处的文化环境告诉他们，追求自我满足是一种不良（或至少是不成熟）的动机；自我（ego）充其量只是一种只有 prima donna（ prima donna 指自我中心的名人，尤指艺术家）才能被容忍的怪癖，且往往是精神病态的实际表现。只有经过升华和伪装的形式，如"同行声誉""自尊""专业精神"或"成就感"，才被普遍接受。

I could write an entire other essay on the unhealthy roots of this part of our cultural inheritance, and the astonishing amount of self-deceptive harm we do by believing (against all the evidence of psychology and behavior) that we ever have truly 'selfless' motives. Perhaps I would, if Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche and Ayn Rand had not already done an entirely competent job (whatever their other failings) of deconstructing 'altruism' into unacknowledged kinds of self-interest.

我本可以专门写一篇文章，探讨这部分文化遗产的不健康根源，以及我们违背心理学和行为学所有证据、坚信自己拥有真正"无私"动机时，所造成的惊人的自欺伤害。如果弗里德里希·威廉·尼采和艾茵·兰德没有（无论他们在其他方面有何缺陷）出色地将"利他主义"解构为未被承认的自我利益形式，或许我真的会这么做。

But I am not doing moral philosophy or psychology here, so I will simply observe one minor kind of harm done by the belief that ego is evil, which is this: it has made it emotionally difficult for many hackers to consciously understand the social dynamics of their own culture!

但我此处并非在探讨道德哲学或心理学，因此我仅指出一个由"自我（ego）是邪恶的"这一信念所造成的小伤害：它让许多黑客在情感上难以有意识地理解自己文化的社会动态！

But we are not quite done with this line of investigation. The surrounding culture's taboo against visibly ego-driven behavior is so much intensified in the hacker (sub)culture that one must suspect it of having some sort of special adaptive function for hackers. Certainly the taboo is weaker (or nonexistent) among many other gift cultures, such as the peer cultures of theater people or the very wealthy!

但我们的这一探究还未结束。周边文化中对明显受自我驱动行为的禁忌，在黑客（亚）文化中被极大地强化了，因此我们必须推测，它对黑客而言具有某种特殊的适应功能。当然，在许多其他礼物文化中，这种禁忌要弱得多（或根本不存在），例如戏剧界人士或极富人群的同行文化！

11. The Value of Humility

11. 谦逊的价值

Having established that prestige is central to the hacker culture's reward mechanisms, we now need to understand why it has seemed so important that this fact remain semi-covert and largely unadmitted.

既然我们已经确定声望是黑客文化奖励机制的核心，现在就需要理解为何这一事实必须保持半隐蔽且基本不被承认，这一点似乎至关重要。

The contrast with the pirate culture is instructive. In that culture, status-seeking behavior is overt and even blatant. These crackers seek acclaim for releasing "zero-day warez" (cracked software redistributed on the day of the original uncracked version's release) but are closemouthed about how they do it. These magicians don't like to give away their tricks. And, as a result, the knowledge base of the cracker culture as a whole increases only slowly.

与海盗文化的对比很有启发意义。在海盗文化中，追求地位的行为是公开甚至肆无忌惮的。这些破解者通过发布"零日盗版软件"（在原版未破解软件发布当天就重新分发的破解版本）来寻求赞誉，但对自己的破解方法却守口如瓶。这些"魔术师"不愿泄露自己的技巧。结果，整个破解者文化的知识库增长极为缓慢。

In the hacker community, by contrast, one's work is one's statement. There's a very strict meritocracy (the best craftsmanship wins) and there's a strong ethos that quality should (indeed must) be left to speak for itself. The best brag is code that "just works", and that any competent programmer can see is good stuff. Thus, the hacker culture's knowledge base increases rapidly.

相比之下，在黑客社区中，一个人的工作就是他的宣言。这里存在着非常严格的精英制度（最优秀的技艺获胜），且有一种强烈的信条：质量应该（实际上必须）自己说话。最好的炫耀是"能直接运行"的代码------任何有能力的程序员都能看出其优秀之处。因此，黑客文化的知识库增长迅速。

The taboo against ego-driven posturing therefore increases productivity. But that's a second-order effect; what is being directly protected here is the quality of the information in the community's peer-evaluation system. That is, boasting or self-importance is suppressed because it behaves like noise tending to corrupt the vital signals from experiments in creative and cooperative behavior.

因此，对受自我驱动的装腔作势的禁忌提高了生产力。但这是一个二阶效应；此处直接受到保护的是社区同行评价系统中信息的质量。也就是说，吹嘘或自视甚高的行为被抑制，因为它们就像噪音，容易干扰来自创造性和合作性行为实验的关键信号。

For very similar reasons, attacking the author rather than the code is not done. There is an interesting subtlety here that reinforces the point; hackers feel very free to flame each other over ideological and personal differences, but it is unheard of for any hacker to publicly attack another's competence at technical work (even private criticism is unusual and tends to be muted in tone). Bug-hunting and criticism are always project-labeled, not person-labeled.

出于非常相似的原因，攻击作者而非代码的行为是不可接受的。这里有一个有趣的微妙之处可以强化这一点：黑客们在意识形态和个人分歧上可以毫无顾忌地互相指责，但从未有黑客公开攻击他人的技术能力（即使是私下批评也很少见，且语气往往较为温和）。漏洞排查和批评始终针对项目，而非个人。

Furthermore, past bugs are not automatically held against a developer; the fact that a bug has been fixed is generally considered more important than the fact that one used to be there. As one respondent observed, one can gain status by fixing 'Emacs bugs', but not by fixing 'Richard Stallman's bugs' -- and it would be considered extremely bad form to criticize Stallman for old Emacs bugs that have since been fixed.

此外，过去的漏洞不会自动成为针对开发者的负面评价；漏洞已被修复这一事实，通常比漏洞曾经存在的事实更重要。正如一位反馈者所观察到的，一个人可以通过修复"Emacs 漏洞"获得地位，但不能通过修复"理查德·斯托曼的漏洞"获得------而且，批评斯托曼曾经的 Emacs 漏洞（如今已被修复）会被视为极其不当的行为。

This makes an interesting contrast with many parts of academia, in which trashing putatively defective work by others is an important mode of gaining reputation. In the hacker culture, such behavior is rather heavily tabooed -- so heavily, in fact, that the absence of such behavior did not present itself to me as a datum until that one respondent with an unusual perspective pointed it out nearly a full year after this paper was first published!

这与学术界的许多领域形成了有趣的对比------在学术界，贬低他人据称有缺陷的作品是获得声誉的重要方式。而在黑客文化中，这种行为被严格禁止------禁止程度之深，以至于在本文首次发表近一年后，那位具有独特视角的反馈者指出这一点之前，我甚至从未意识到这种行为的缺失是一个值得关注的现象！

The taboo against attacks on competence (not shared with academia) is even more revealing than the (shared) taboo on posturing, because we can relate it to a difference between academia and hackerdom in their communications and support structures.

这种对攻击他人能力的禁忌（学术界没有这种禁忌），比（与学术界共有的）对装腔作势的禁忌更具启发意义，因为我们可以将其与学术界和黑客社区在沟通及支持结构上的差异联系起来。

The hacker culture's medium of gifting is intangible, its communications channels are poor at expressing emotional nuance, and face-to-face contact among its members is the exception rather than the rule. This gives it a lower tolerance of noise than most other gift cultures, and goes a long way to explain the taboo against attacks on competence. Any significant incidence of flames over hackers' competence would intolerably disrupt the culture's reputation scoreboard.

黑客文化的礼物媒介是无形的，其沟通渠道难以传递情感细微差别，且成员之间的面对面接触是例外而非常态。这使得它对噪音的容忍度低于大多数其他礼物文化，也在很大程度上解释了为何存在攻击他人能力的禁忌。任何因黑客能力引发的大规模指责，都会不可容忍地扰乱该文化的声誉评分体系。

The same vulnerability to noise goes for to explain the example in public humility required of the hacker community's tribal elders. They must be seen to be free of boast and posturing so the taboo against dangerous noise will hold. [DC]

同样的噪音脆弱性也可以解释为何黑客社区的资深前辈必须保持公开谦逊。他们必须被视为没有吹嘘和装腔作势的行为，这样才能维护对危险噪音的禁忌。[DC]

Talking softly is also functional if one aspires to be a maintainer of a successful project; one must convince the community that one has good judgement, because most of the maintainer's job is going to be judging other people's code. Who would be inclined to contribute work to someone who clearly can't judge the quality of their own code, or whose behavior suggests they will attempt to unfairly hog the reputation return from the project? Potential contributors want project leaders with enough humility and class be able to to say, when objectively appropriate, "Yes, that does work better than my version, I'll use it" -- and to give credit where credit is due.

如果一个人渴望成为一个成功项目的维护者，说话温和也是一种实用的策略；他必须让社区相信自己具有良好的判断力，因为维护者的大部分工作都是评判他人的代码。谁会愿意为一个显然无法判断自己代码质量，或行为表明会试图不公平地独占项目声誉回报的人贡献工作呢？潜在贡献者希望项目领导者足够谦逊且有风度，能够在客观合适的情况下说："是的，这个版本确实比我的好，我会采用它"------并给予应有的赞誉。

Yet another reason for humble behavior is that in the open source world, you seldom want to give the impression that a project is 'done'. This might lead a potential contributor not to feel needed. The way to maximize your leverage is to be humble about the state of the program. If one does one's bragging through the code, and then says "Well shucks, it doesn't do x, y, and z, so it can't be that good", patches for x, y, and z will often swiftly follow.

谦逊行为的另一个原因是，在开源世界中，你很少希望给人留下项目"已经完成"的印象。这可能会让潜在贡献者觉得自己没有被需要。最大化影响力的方式是对程序的现状保持谦逊。如果一个人通过代码来证明自己的能力，然后说："哎呀，它还做不了 x、y 和 z，所以还不算太好"，那么针对 x、y 和 z 的补丁往往会很快出现。

Finally, I have personally observed that the self-deprecating behavior of some leading hackers reflects a real (and not unjustified) fear of becoming the object of a personality cult. Linus Torvalds and Larry Wall both provide clear and numerous examples of such avoidance behavior. Once, on a dinner expedition with Larry Wall, I joked "You're the alpha hacker here -- you get to pick the restaurant". He flinched audibly. And rightly so; failing to distinguish their shared values from the personalities of their leaders has ruined a good many voluntary communities, a pattern of which Larry and Linus cannot fail to be fully aware. On the other hand, most hackers would love to have Larry's problem, if they could but bring themselves to admit it.

最后，我个人观察到，一些顶尖黑客的自我贬低行为，反映了一种真实（且并非没有道理）的恐惧------害怕成为个人崇拜的对象。林纳斯·托瓦兹和拉里·沃尔都有许多明显的此类回避行为的例子。有一次，我和拉里·沃尔一起吃晚饭时开玩笑说："你是这里的顶级黑客------你来选餐厅吧。" 他明显地瑟缩了一下。这很合理；许多自愿社区之所以失败，就是因为无法将共同价值观与领导者的个人特质区分开来，拉里和林纳斯肯定非常清楚这一模式。但另一方面，大多数黑客如果能坦然承认的话，其实都希望能遇到拉里这样的"麻烦"。

12. Global Implications of the Reputation-Game Model

12. 声誉游戏模型的全球影响

The reputation-game analysis has some more implications that may not be immediately obvious. Many of these derive from the fact that one gains more prestige from founding a successful project than from cooperating in an existing one. One also gains more from projects which are strikingly innovative, as opposed to being 'me, too' incremental improvements on software that already exists. On the other hand, software that nobody but the author understands or has a need for is a non-starter in the reputation game, and it's often easier to attract good notice by contributing to an existing project than it is to get people to notice a new one. Finally, it's much harder to compete with an already successful project than it is to fill an empty niche.

声誉游戏分析还有一些不那么显而易见的影响。其中许多影响源于这样一个事实：创建一个成功的项目比在现有项目中合作能获得更多声望；参与极具创新性的项目也比在已有软件基础上进行"跟风式"增量改进能获得更多声望。另一方面，只有作者自己理解或需要的软件，在声誉游戏中毫无胜算；而且，通过为现有项目做贡献往往比让人们关注一个新项目更容易获得好评。最后，与一个已经成功的项目竞争，远比填补一个空白领域难得多。

Thus, there's an optimum distance from one's neighbors (the most similar competing projects). Too close and one's product will be a "me, too!" of limited value, a poor gift (one would be better off contributing to an existing project). Too far away, and nobody will be able to use, understand, or perceive the relevance of one's effort (again, a poor gift). This creates a pattern of homesteading in the noosphere that rather resembles that of settlers spreading into a physical frontier -- not random, but like a diffusion-limited fractal. Projects tend to get started to fill functional gaps near the frontier (see [NO] for further discussion of the lure of novelty).

因此，与"邻居"（最相似的竞争项目）之间存在一个最佳距离。距离太近，产品就会成为"跟风之作"，价值有限，算不上好礼物（此时不如为现有项目做贡献）；距离太远，没人能使用、理解或感知到你的努力的相关性（同样算不上好礼物）。这使得智域中的拓荒模式类似于定居者向实体边疆扩张的模式------并非随机扩张，而是像扩散受限的分形。项目的启动往往是为了填补边疆附近的功能空白（关于新颖性的吸引力，详见[NO]）。

Some very successful projects become 'category killers'; nobody wants to homestead anywhere near them because competing against the established base for the attention of hackers would be too hard. People who might otherwise found their own distinct efforts end up, instead, adding extensions for these big, successful projects. The classic 'category killer' example is GNU Emacs; its variants fill the ecological niche for a fully-programmable editor so completely that no competitor has gotten much beyond the one-man project stage since the early 1980s. Instead, people write Emacs modes.

一些非常成功的项目会成为"品类终结者"；没人愿意在它们附近拓荒，因为与已确立的基础竞争黑客的关注太难了。那些原本可能创建自己独立项目的人，最终反而会为这些大型成功项目开发扩展功能。典型的"品类终结者"例子是 GNU Emacs；它的变体完全占据了全可编程编辑器的生态位，以至于自 20 世纪 80 年代初以来，没有任何竞争对手能超越单人项目的规模。相反，人们纷纷编写 Emacs 模式。

Globally, these two tendencies (gap-filling and category-killers) have driven a broadly predictable trend in project starts over time. In the 1970s most of the open source that existed was toys and demos. In the 1980s the push was in development and Internet tools. In the 1990s the action shifted to operating systems. In each case, a new and more difficult level of problems was attacked when the possibilities of the previous one had been nearly exhausted.

在全球范围内，这两种趋势（填补空白和品类终结）随着时间的推移，推动了项目启动的大致可预测趋势。20 世纪 70 年代，现存的开源软件大多是玩具和演示程序；80 年代，开发重心转向开发工具和互联网工具；90 年代，行动转移到操作系统领域。在每一种情况下，当之前的领域潜力几乎被耗尽时，人们就会着手攻克一个新的、更困难的问题层面。

This trend has interesting implications for the near future. In early 1998, Linux looks very much like a category-killer for the niche 'open-source operating systems' -- people who might otherwise write competing operating systems are now writing Linux device drivers and extensions instead. And most of the lower-level tools the culture ever imagined having as open-source already exist. What's left?

这一趋势对近期未来有着有趣的启示。1998 年初，Linux 看起来非常像"开源操作系统"这一细分领域的品类终结者------那些原本可能编写竞争操作系统的人，现在转而编写 Linux 设备驱动程序和扩展功能。而且，该文化所设想的大多数底层开源工具已经存在。那么，还剩下什么呢？

Applications. As the year 2000 approaches, it seems safe to predict that open-source development effort will increasingly shift towards the last virgin territory -- programs for non-techies. A clear early indicator is the development of GIMP, the Photoshop-like image workshop that is open source's first major application with the kind of end-user-friendly GUI interface considered de rigueur in commercial applications for the last decade. Another is the amount of buzz surrounding application-toolkit projects like KDE and GNOME.

应用程序。随着 2000 年的临近，我们完全可以预测，开源开发的重心将越来越转向最后一块处女地------面向非技术人员的程序。一个明显的早期迹象是 GIMP 的开发，这款类似 Photoshop 的图像处理软件是开源领域第一个拥有终端用户友好型图形用户界面（GUI）的主要应用程序，而这种界面在过去十年的商业应用中已被视为必备功能。另一个迹象是 KDE 和 GNOME 等应用程序工具包项目所引发的广泛关注。

A respondent to this paper has pointed out that the homesteading analogy also explains why hackers react with such visceral anger to Microsoft's "embrace and extend" policy of complexifying and then closing up Internet protocols. The hacker culture can coexist with most closed software; the existence of Adobe Photoshop, for example, does not make the territory near GIMP (its open-source equivalent) significantly less attractive. But when Microsoft succeeds at de-commoditizing [HD] a protocol so that only Microsoft's own programmers can write software for it, they do not merely harm customers by extending their monopoly. They also reduce the amount and quality of noosphere available for hackers to homestead and cultivate. No wonder hackers often refer to Microsoft's strategy as "protocol pollution"; they are reacting exactly like farmers watching someone poison the river they water their crops with!

本文的一位反馈者指出，拓荒类比还解释了为何黑客会对微软的"拥抱并扩展"政策产生如此本能的愤怒------该政策通过复杂化互联网协议，然后将其封闭起来。黑客文化可以与大多数闭源软件共存；例如，Adobe Photoshop 的存在并不会使 GIMP（其开源等效产品）附近的领域吸引力显著降低。但当微软成功地将某一协议"去商品化"[HD]，使得只有微软自己的程序员才能为其编写软件时，他们不仅通过扩大垄断伤害了消费者，还减少了黑客可拓荒和培育的智域数量与质量。难怪黑客们常将微软的策略称为"协议污染"；他们的反应就像农民看到有人污染他们灌溉庄稼的河流一样！

Finally, the reputation-game analysis explains the oft-cited dictum that you do not become a hacker by calling yourself a hacker -- you become a hacker when other hackers call you a hacker. A 'hacker', considered in this light, is somebody who has shown (by contributing gifts) that he or she both has technical ability and understands how the reputation game works. This judgement is mostly one of awareness and acculturation, and can only be delivered by those already well inside the culture.

最后，声誉游戏分析解释了那句常被引用的格言：自称黑客并不能让你成为黑客------只有当其他黑客称你为黑客时，你才是黑客。从这个角度来看，"黑客"是指那些（通过贡献礼物）证明自己既具备技术能力，又理解声誉游戏规则的人。这种判断主要基于认知和文化适应程度，且只能由那些已深度融入该文化的人做出。

13. How Fine a Gift?

13. 一份礼物的价值几何？

There are consistent patterns in the way the hacker culture values contributions and returns peer esteem for them. It's not hard to observe the following rules:

黑客文化对贡献的评价以及给予同行赞誉的方式，存在着一致的模式。我们不难发现以下规则：

1. If it doesn't work as well as I have been led to expect it will, it's no good -- no matter how clever and original it is.

   无论构思多么巧妙、多么新颖，只要它的表现没有达到我被引导所期望的水平，它就不算好。

   Note the 'led to expect'. This rule is not a demand for perfection; beta and experimental software is allowed to have bugs. It's a demand that the user be able to accurately estimate risks from the stage of the project and the developers' representations about it.

   注意"被引导所期望"这一点。该规则并非要求完美；测试版和实验性软件允许存在漏洞。它要求用户能够根据项目的阶段和开发者的描述，准确评估风险。

   This rule underlies the fact that open-source software tends to stay in beta for a long time, and not get even a 1.0 version number until the developers are very sure it will not hand out a lot of nasty surprises. In the closed-source world, Version 1.0 means "Don't touch this if you're prudent."; in the open-source world it reads something more like "The developers are willing to bet their reputations on this."

   这一规则解释了为何开源软件往往会长时间停留在测试版阶段，直到开发者非常确定它不会出现太多令人不快的意外，才会发布 1.0 版本。在闭源世界中，1.0 版本意味着"谨慎起见，请勿使用"；而在开源世界中，它更像是在说"开发者愿意为这个版本赌上自己的声誉"。

2. Work that extends the noosphere is better than work that duplicates an existing piece of functional territory.

   拓展智域的工作比重复已有功能领域的工作更有价值。

   The naive way to put this would have been: Original work is better than duplicating the functions of existing software. But it's not actually quite that simple. Duplicating the functions of existing closed software counts as highly as original work if by doing so you break open a closed protocol or format and make that territory newly available.

   简单的说法是：原创工作比重复现有软件功能的工作更好。但实际情况并非如此简单。如果重复现有闭源软件的功能能够打破封闭的协议或格式，使该领域重新开放，那么这种工作与原创工作具有同等价值。

   Thus, for example, one of the highest-prestige projects in the present open-source world is Samba -- the code that allows Unix machines to act as clients or servers for Microsoft's proprietary SMB file-sharing protocol. There is very little creative work to be done here; it's mostly an issue of getting the reverse-engineered details right. Nevertheless, the members of the Samba group are perceived as heroes because they neutralize a Microsoft effort to lock in whole user populations and cordon off a big section of the noosphere.

   例如，当前开源世界中最具声望的项目之一是 Samba------这款代码允许 Unix 机器作为微软专有 SMB 文件共享协议的客户端或服务器。这里几乎不需要创造性工作；主要是准确进行逆向工程的细节问题。尽管如此，Samba 团队的成员仍被视为英雄，因为他们挫败了微软锁定整个用户群体并封锁智域大片区域的企图。

3. Work that makes it into a major distribution is better than work that doesn't. Work carried in all major distributions is most prestigious.

   被纳入主流发行版的工作比未被纳入的更有价值；被所有主流发行版纳入的工作最具声望。

   The major distributions include not just the big Linux distributions like Red Hat, Debian, Caldera, and S.u.S.E., but other collections that are understood to have reputations of their own to maintain and thus implicitly certify quality -- like BSD distributions or the Free Software Foundation source collection.

   主流发行版不仅包括 Red Hat、Debian、Caldera 和 S.u.S.E. 等大型 Linux 发行版，还包括其他被认为需要维护自身声誉、从而隐含质量认证功能的集合------例如 BSD 发行版或自由软件基金会源代码集合。

4. Utilization is the sincerest form of flattery -- and category killers are better than also-rans.

   使用率是最真诚的赞美------品类终结者比失败者更有价值。

   Trusting the judgment of others is basic to the peer-review process. It's necessary because nobody has time to review all possible alternatives. So work used by lots of people is considered better than work used by a few.

   信任他人的判断是同行评审过程的基础。这是必要的，因为没有人有时间审查所有可能的替代方案。因此，被许多人使用的工作被认为比被少数人使用的工作更好。

   To have done work so good that nobody cares to use the alternatives any more is therefore to have earned huge prestige. The most possible peer esteem comes from having done widely popular, category-killing original work that is carried by all major distributions. People who have pulled this off more than once are half-seriously referred to as 'demigods'.

   因此，若你的工作做得足够好，以至于没人再愿意使用其他替代方案，你将获得巨大的声望。获得同行最多赞誉的方式，是创作出让广泛受欢迎、能成为品类终结者的原创工作，并被所有主流发行版纳入。那些多次做到这一点的人，会被半开玩笑地称为"半神"。

5. Continued devotion to hard, boring work (like debugging, or writing documentation) is more praiseworthy than cherrypicking the fun and easy hacks.

   持续投入到艰难、枯燥的工作中（如调试或编写文档），比专挑有趣、简单的修改工作更值得称赞。

   This norm is how the community rewards necessary tasks that hackers would not naturally incline towards. It is to some extent contradicted by:

   这一规范是社区对黑客们本不愿主动承担的必要任务的奖励方式。但它在一定程度上与以下规则相矛盾：

6. Nontrivial extensions of function are better than low-level patches and debugging.

   非琐碎的功能扩展比底层补丁和调试更有价值。

The way this seems to work is that on a one-shot basis, adding a feature is likely to get more reward than fixing a bug -- unless the bug is exceptionally nasty or obscure, such that nailing it is itself a demonstration of unusual skill and cleverness. But when these behaviors are extended over time, a person with a long history of paying attention to and nailing even ordinary bugs may well rank someone who has spent a similar amount of effort adding easy features.

这两条规则的运作方式似乎是：单次来看，添加一个功能比修复一个漏洞更有可能获得奖励------除非这个漏洞特别棘手或隐蔽，以至于修复它本身就是一种非凡技能和智慧的体现。但如果将这些行为延伸到长期，一个长期关注并修复甚至普通漏洞的人，其地位很可能与花费相似精力添加简单功能的人相当。

A respondent has pointed out that these rules interact in interesting ways and do not necessarily reward highest possible utility all the time. Ask a hacker whether he's likely to become better known for a brand new tool of his own or for extensions to someone else's and the answer "new tool" will not be in doubt. But ask about

一位反馈者指出，这些规则以有趣的方式相互作用，且并非总能奖励效用最高的工作。如果你问一个黑客，他更有可能因自己的全新工具而闻名，还是因他人工具的扩展功能而闻名，答案无疑是"全新工具"。但如果你问：

• (a) a brand new tool which is only used a few times a day invisibly by the OS but which rapidly becomes a category killer
  (a) 一个全新工具，操作系统每天会在后台无形地使用它几次，但它迅速成为品类终结者；

versus

对比

• (b) several extensions to an existing tool which are neither especially novel nor category-killers, but are daily used and daily visible to a huge number of users
  (b) 现有工具的多个扩展功能，它们既不特别新颖，也不是品类终结者，但每天被大量用户使用并可见；

and you are likely to get some hesitation before the hacker settles on (a). These alternatives are about evenly stacked.

那么黑客在选择 (a) 之前可能会犹豫。这两种选择的价值大致相当。

Said respondent gave this question point for me by adding "Case (a) is fetchmail; case (b) is your many Emacs extensions, like vc.el and gud.el." And indeed he is correct; I am more likely to be tagged 'the author of fetchmail' than 'author of a boatload of Emacs modes', even though the latter probably have had higher total utility over time.

这位反馈者进一步举例说明："案例 (a) 是 fetchmail；案例 (b) 是你开发的众多 Emacs 扩展，如 vc.el 和 gud.el。" 他说得确实没错；尽管从长期来看，那些 Emacs 扩展的总效用可能更高，但我更有可能被贴上"fetchmail 的作者"的标签，而非"一大堆 Emacs 模式的作者"。

What may be going on here is simply that work with a novel 'brand identity' gets more notice than work aggregated to an existing 'brand'. Elucidation of these rules, and what they tell us about the hacker culture's scoreboarding system, would make a good topic for further investigation.

这背后可能的原因很简单：具有新颖"品牌标识"的工作，比归属于现有"品牌"的工作更受关注。深入阐释这些规则，以及它们所揭示的黑客文化评分体系，将是一个值得进一步研究的课题。

14. Noospheric Property and the Ethology of Territory

14. 智域财产与领地行为学

To understand the causes and consequences of Lockean property customs, it will help us to look at them from yet another angle; that of animal ethology, specifically the ethology of territory.

要理解洛克式财产惯例的成因和后果，我们可以从另一个角度进行考察：动物行为学，特别是领地行为学。

Property is an abstraction of animal territoriality, which evolved as a way of reducing intra-species violence. By marking his bounds, and respecting the bounds of others, a wolf diminishes his chances of being in a fight that could weaken or kill him and make him less reproductively successful. Similarly, the function of property in human societies is to prevent inter-human conflict by setting bounds that clearly separate peaceful behavior from aggression.

财产是动物领地行为的抽象产物，动物领地行为的进化目的是减少物种内部的暴力冲突。狼通过标记自己的领地边界并尊重他人的边界，降低了卷入可能导致自己受伤、死亡或繁殖成功率下降的争斗的概率。同样，人类社会中财产的功能是通过设定明确区分和平行为与攻击行为的边界，来预防人际冲突。

It is fashionable in some circles to describe human property as an arbitrary social convention, but this is dead wrong. Anybody who has ever owned a dog who barked when strangers came near its owner's property has experienced the essential continuity between animal territoriality and human property. Our domesticated cousins of the wolf know, instinctively, that property is no mere social convention or game, but a critically important evolved mechanism for the avoidance of violence. (This makes them smarter than a good many human political theorists.)

在某些圈子里，将人类财产描述为任意的社会惯例是一种时尚，但这完全错误。任何养过狗的人都有过这样的经历：当陌生人靠近主人的财产时，狗会吠叫------这一现象体现了动物领地行为与人类财产概念之间的本质连续性。我们这些被驯化的狼的近亲，本能地知道财产绝非单纯的社会惯例或游戏，而是一种至关重要的、为避免暴力而进化出的机制。（这让它们比许多人类政治理论家更聪明。）

Claiming property (like marking territory) is a performative act, a way of declaring what boundaries will be defended. Community support of property claims is a way to minimize friction and maximize cooperative behavior. These things remain true even when the "property claim" is much more abstract than a fence or a dog's bark, even when it's just the statement of the project maintainer's name in a README file. It's still an abstraction of territoriality, and (like other forms of property) based in territorial instincts evolved to assist conflict resolution.

主张财产所有权（如标记领地）是一种施为行为，一种宣告将捍卫哪些边界的方式。社区对财产所有权主张的支持，是将摩擦最小化、合作行为最大化的方式。即便"财产所有权主张"比栅栏或狗吠抽象得多------即便它只是 README 文件中项目维护者姓名的声明------这些原则仍然成立。它仍然是领地行为的抽象，且（与其他形式的财产一样）基于为协助解决冲突而进化出的领地本能。

This ethological analysis may at first seem very abstract and difficult to relate to actual hacker behavior. But it has some important consequences. One is in explaining the popularity of World Wide Web sites, and especially why open-source projects with websites seem so much more 'real' and substantial than those without them.

这种行为学分析起初可能显得非常抽象，难以与黑客的实际行为联系起来。但它有一些重要的启示。其中之一是解释了万维网网站的普及，尤其是为何拥有网站的开源项目比没有网站的项目看起来更"真实"、更具实质性。

Considered objectively, this seems hard to explain. Compared to the effort involved in originating and maintaining even a small program, a web page is easy, so it's hard to consider a web page evidence of substance or unusual effort.

客观来看，这一现象似乎难以解释。与创建和维护一个哪怕很小的程序所付出的努力相比，制作一个网页非常容易，因此很难将网页视为实质性或非凡努力的证据。

Nor are the functional characteristics of the Web itself sufficient explanation. The communication functions of a web page can be as well or better served by a combination of an FTP site, a mailing list, and Usenet postings. In fact it's quite unusual for a project's routine communications to be done over the Web rather than via a mailing list or newsgroup. Why, then, the popularity of Web sites as project homes?

网络本身的功能特性也不足以解释这一点。网页的沟通功能完全可以通过 FTP 站点、邮件列表和新闻组帖子的组合来实现，甚至效果更好。事实上，项目的日常沟通通过网络而非邮件列表或新闻组进行的情况非常罕见。那么，为何网站作为项目主页如此受欢迎？

The metaphor implicit in the term 'home page' provides an important clue. While founding an open-source project is a territorial claim in the noosphere (and customarily recognized as such) it is not a terribly compelling one on the psychological level. Software, after all, has no natural location and is instantly reduplicable. It's assimilable to our instinctive notions of 'territory' and 'property', but only after some effort.

"主页"（home page）这一术语中隐含的隐喻提供了重要线索。创建一个开源项目虽然是在智域中主张领地（且惯例上也认可这一点），但在心理层面上，这种主张并不十分有说服力。毕竟，软件没有自然位置，且可以立即复制。它虽然能被我们本能的"领地"和"财产"概念所接纳，但需要一定的努力。

A project home page concretizes an abstract homesteading in the space of possible programs by expressing it as 'home' territory in the more spatially-organized realm of the World Wide Web. Descending from the noosphere to 'cyberspace' doesn't get us all the way to the real world of fences and barking dogs yet, but it does hook the abstract property claim more securely to our instinctive wiring about territory. And this is why projects with web pages seem more 'real'.

项目主页通过在空间组织更清晰的万维网领域中将其表达为"家园"领地，将可能程序空间中的抽象拓荒具体化。从智域下降到"赛博空间"，虽然还没有完全抵达有栅栏和狗吠的现实世界，但它确实将抽象的财产主张更牢固地与我们关于领地的本能联系起来。这就是为什么有网站的项目看起来更"真实"。

This point is much strengthened by hyperlinks and the existence of good search engines. A project with a web page is much more likely to be noticed by somebody exploring its neighborhood in the noosphere; others will link to it, searches will find it. A web page is therefore a better advertisement, a more effective performative act, a stronger claim on territory.

超链接和优质搜索引擎的存在进一步强化了这一点。一个有网站的项目，更容易被在智域中探索其周边领域的人发现；其他人会链接到它，搜索引擎会找到它。因此，网页是更好的宣传工具、更有效的施为行为、更有力的领地主张。

This ethological analysis also encourages us to look more closely at mechanisms for handling conflict in the open-source culture. It leads us to expect that, in addition to maximizing reputation incentives, ownership customs should also have a role in preventing and resolving conflicts.

这种行为学分析还鼓励我们更深入地研究开源文化中的冲突处理机制。它让我们期望，除了最大化声誉激励外，所有权惯例还应在预防和解决冲突方面发挥作用。

15. Causes of Conflict

15. 冲突的起因

In conflicts over open-source software we can identify four major issues:

在与开源软件相关的冲突中，我们可以识别出四个主要问题：

• Who gets to make binding decisions about a project?
  谁有权对项目做出具有约束力的决策？
• Who gets credit or blame for what?
  谁应为哪些事情获得赞誉或承担责任？
• How to reduce duplication of effort and prevent rogue versions from complicating bug tracking?
  如何减少工作重复并防止非官方版本使漏洞追踪变得复杂？
• What is the Right Thing, technically speaking?
  从技术角度来看，正确的做法是什么？

If we take a second look at the "What is the Right Thing" issue, however, it tends to vanish. For any such question, either there is an objective way to decide it accepted by all parties or there isn't. If there is, game over and everybody wins. If there isn't, it reduces to "who decides?".

然而，如果我们再仔细审视"正确的做法是什么"这一问题，它往往会消失。对于任何此类问题，要么存在所有各方都接受的客观决策方式，要么不存在。如果存在，冲突结束，皆大欢喜；如果不存在，问题就会简化为"谁来决策？"。

Accordingly, the three problems a conflict-resolution theory has to resolve about a project are (A) where the buck stops on design decisions, (B) how to decide which contributors are credited and how, and © how to keep a project group and product from fissioning into multiple branches.

因此，冲突解决理论需要解决的与项目相关的三个问题是：(A) 设计决策的最终责任归属；(B) 如何确定哪些贡献者应获得赞誉以及如何赞誉；© 如何防止项目团队和产品分裂为多个分支。

The role of ownership customs in resolving issues (A) and © is clear. Custom affirms that the owners of the project make the binding decisions. We have previously observed that custom also exerts heavy pressure against dilution of ownership by forking.

所有权惯例在解决问题 (A) 和 © 中的作用很明确。惯例规定，项目所有者做出具有约束力的决策。我们之前已经观察到，惯例还对通过分支稀释所有权施加了巨大压力。

It's instructive to notice that these customs make sense even if one forgets the reputation game and examines them from within a pure 'craftsmanship' model of the hacker culture. In this view these customs have less to do with the dilution of reputation incentives than with protecting a craftsman's right to execute his vision in his chosen way.

值得注意的是，即使我们抛开声誉游戏，仅从黑客文化的纯粹"技艺"模型来看，这些惯例也是合理的。从这个角度来看，这些惯例与其说是为了避免声誉激励被稀释，不如说是为了保护工匠以自己选择的方式实现其愿景的权利。

The craftsmanship model is not, however, sufficient to explain hacker customs about issue (B), who gets credit for what (because a pure craftsman, one unconcerned with the reputation game, would have no motive to care). To analyze these, we need to take the Lockean theory one step further and examine conflicts and the operation of property rights within projects as well as between them.

然而，技艺模型不足以解释黑客文化中关于问题 (B)（谁应为哪些事情获得赞誉）的惯例------因为一个纯粹的工匠，一个不关心声誉游戏的人，没有理由在意这一点。要分析这些惯例，我们需要将洛克式理论再推进一步，考察项目内部以及项目之间的冲突和财产权运作。

16. Project Structures and Ownership

16. 项目结构与所有权

The trivial case is that in which the project has a single owner/maintainer. In that case there is no possible conflict. The owner makes all decisions and collects all credit and blame. The only possible conflicts are over succession issues -- who gets to be the new owner if the old one disappears or loses interest. The community also has an interest, under issue ©, in preventing forking. These interests are expressed by a cultural norm that an owner/maintainer should publicly hand title to someone if he or she can no longer maintain the project.

最简单的情况是项目只有一个所有者/维护者。在这种情况下，不可能存在冲突。所有者做出所有决策，并承担所有赞誉和责任。唯一可能的冲突是关于继任问题------如果原所有者失联或失去兴趣，谁将成为新所有者。根据问题 ©，社区也有兴趣防止分支现象。这些利益通过一种文化规范得以体现：如果所有者/维护者无法再维护项目，应公开将所有权移交他人。

The simplest non-trivial case is when a project has multiple co-maintainers working under a single 'benevolent dictator' who owns the project. Custom favors this mode for group projects; it has been shown to work on projects as large as the Linux kernel or Emacs, and solves the "who decides" problem in a way that is not obviously worse than any of the alternatives.

最简单的非 trivial 情况是，项目有多个联合维护者，在单一的项目所有者（即"仁慈的独裁者"）领导下工作。惯例更倾向于群体项目采用这种模式；它已在 Linux 内核或 Emacs 等大型项目中被证明是有效的，并且以一种并不明显逊色于其他替代方案的方式解决了"谁来决策"的问题。

Typically, a benevolent-dictator organization evolves from an owner-maintainer organization as the founder attracts contributors. Even if the owner stays dictator, it introduces a new level of possible disputes over who gets credited for what parts of the project.

通常，仁慈的独裁者组织是从所有者-维护者组织演变而来的：创始人吸引了贡献者加入。即使所有者仍然担任独裁者，这也会引入一个新层面的潜在争议------谁应为项目的哪些部分获得赞誉。

In this situation, custom places an obligation on the owner/dictator to credit contributors fairly (through, for example, appropriate mentions in README or history files). In terms of the Lockean property model, this means that by contributing to a project you earn part of its reputation return (positive or negative).

在这种情况下，惯例要求所有者/独裁者公平地给予贡献者赞誉（例如，在 README 文件或历史文件中适当提及）。根据洛克式财产模型，这意味着通过为项目做出贡献，你获得了该项目部分声誉回报（正面或负面）的权利。

Pursuing this logic, we see that a 'benevolent dictator' does not in fact own his entire project unqualifiedly. Though he has the right to make binding decisions, he in effect trades away shares of the total reputation return in exchange for others' work. The analogy with sharecropping on a farm is almost irresistible, except that a contributor's name stays in the credits and continues to 'earn' to some degree even after that contributor is no longer active.

按照这一逻辑，我们可以发现，"仁慈的独裁者"实际上并非无条件地拥有整个项目。尽管他有权做出具有约束力的决策，但他实际上是通过出让部分总声誉回报的份额，来换取他人的工作。这与农场中的佃农制度（sharecropping）有着几乎无法抗拒的相似性------不同之处在于，贡献者的名字会留在致谢名单中，即使在该贡献者不再活跃后，仍会在某种程度上"持续获得"声誉。

As benevolent-dictator projects add more participants, they tend to develop two tiers of contributors; ordinary contributors and co-developers. A typical path to becoming a co-developer is taking responsibility for a major subsystem of the project. Another is to take the role of 'lord high fixer', characterizing and fixing many bugs. In this way or others, co-developers are the contributors who make a substantial and continuing investment of time in the project.

随着仁慈的独裁者项目加入更多参与者，它们往往会形成两层贡献者结构：普通贡献者和联合开发者。成为联合开发者的典型途径是负责项目的一个主要子系统；另一种途径是担任"首席修复官"，负责识别和修复许多漏洞。无论通过哪种方式，联合开发者都是那些为项目做出大量且持续时间投入的贡献者。

The subsystem-owner role is particularly important for our analysis and deserves further examination. Hackers like to say that 'authority follows responsibility'. A co-developer who accepts maintenance responsibility for a given subsystem generally gets to control both the implementation of that subsystem and its interfaces with the rest of the project, subject only to correction by the project leader (acting as architect). We observe that this rule effectively creates enclosed properties on the Lockean model within a project, and has exactly the same conflict-prevention role as other property boundaries.

子系统所有者的角色对我们的分析尤为重要，值得进一步探讨。黑客们常说"权责相随"（authority follows responsibility）。一个接受了特定子系统维护责任的联合开发者，通常有权控制该子系统的实现及其与项目其他部分的接口------仅需服从项目领导者（作为架构师）的修正。我们观察到，这一规则在项目内部有效地创建了洛克式模型中的封闭财产，并与其他财产边界具有完全相同的冲突预防作用。

By custom, the 'dictator' or project leader in a project with co-developers is expected to consult with those co-developers on key decisions. This is especially so if the decision concerns a subsystem which a co-developer 'owns' (that is, has invested time in and taken responsibility for). A wise leader, recognizing the function of the project's internal property boundaries, will not lightly interfere with or reverse decisions made by subsystem owners.

按照惯例，在有联合开发者的项目中，"独裁者"或项目领导者在做出关键决策时，应与这些联合开发者协商。如果决策涉及某个联合开发者"拥有"的子系统（即已投入时间并承担责任的子系统），情况尤其如此。明智的领导者会认识到项目内部财产边界的功能，不会轻易干预或推翻子系统所有者做出的决策。

Some very large projects discard the 'benevolent dictator' model entirely. One way to do this is turn the co-developers into a voting committee (as with Apache). Another is rotating dictatorship, in which control is occasionally passed from one member to another within a circle of senior co-developers; the Perl developers organize themselves this way.

一些非常大型的项目完全摒弃了"仁慈的独裁者"模型。一种方式是将联合开发者转变为投票委员会（如 Apache 项目）；另一种方式是轮换独裁制，即在资深联合开发者圈子内，控制权偶尔从一个成员转移到另一个成员手中------Perl 开发者就是这样组织的。

Such complicated arrangements are widely considered unstable and difficult. Clearly this perceived difficulty is largely a function of the known hazards of design-by-committee, and of committees themselves; these are problems the hacker culture consciously understands. However, I think some of the visceral discomfort hackers feel about committee or rotating-chair organizations is because they're hard to fit into the unconscious Lockean model hackers use for reasoning about the simpler cases. It's problematic, in these complex organizations, to do an accounting of either ownership in the sense of control or ownership of reputation returns. It's hard to see where the internal boundaries are, and thus hard to avoid conflict unless the group enjoys an exceptionally high level of harmony and trust.

这种复杂的安排被广泛认为是不稳定且难以运作的。显然，这种感知到的困难在很大程度上源于众所周知的委员会设计（design-by-committee）的风险，以及委员会本身的问题------这些都是黑客文化有意识理解的问题。然而，我认为黑客们对委员会或轮换主席制组织的一些本能不适，是因为这些组织难以融入黑客们用于推理简单情况的无意识洛克式模型。在这些复杂组织中，无论是从控制权意义上的所有权，还是声誉回报的所有权，都难以进行核算。人们很难看清内部边界在哪里，因此除非该群体享有极高水平的和谐与信任，否则很难避免冲突。

17. Conflict and Conflict Resolution

17. 冲突与冲突解决

We've seen that within projects, an increasing complexity of roles is expressed by a distribution of design authority and partial property rights. While this is an efficient way to distribute incentives, it also dilutes the authority of the project leader -- most importantly, it dilutes the leader's authority to squash potential conflicts.

我们已经看到，在项目内部，角色的日益复杂化体现在设计权限和部分财产权的分配上。虽然这是一种有效的激励分配方式，但它也稀释了项目领导者的权威------最重要的是，稀释了领导者平息潜在冲突的权威。

While technical arguments over design might seem the most obvious risk for internecine conflict, they are seldom a serious cause of strife. These are usually relatively easily resolved by the territorial rule that authority follows responsibility.

尽管关于设计的技术争论似乎是内部冲突最明显的风险，但它们很少成为严重冲突的根源。这些争论通常可以通过"权责相随"的领地规则相对容易地解决。

Another way of resolving conflicts is by seniority -- if two contributors or groups of contributors have a dispute, and the dispute cannot be resolved objectively, and neither owns the territory of the dispute, the side that has put the most work into the project as a whole (that is, the side with the most property rights in the whole project) wins.

另一种解决冲突的方式是按资历划分------如果两个贡献者或两组贡献者发生争议，且争议无法客观解决，同时双方都不拥有争议领域的所有权，那么在整个项目中投入最多工作的一方（即拥有整个项目最多财产权的一方）获胜。

(Equivalently, the side with the least invested loses. Interestingly this happens to be the same heuristic that many relational database engines resolve deadlocks. When two threads are deadlocked over resources, the side with the least invested in the current transaction is selected as the deadlock victim and is terminated. This usually selects the longest running transaction, or the more senior, as the victor.)

（等价地说，投入最少的一方失败。有趣的是，这与许多关系型数据库引擎解决死锁的启发式算法相同：当两个线程因资源而死锁时，在当前事务中投入最少的一方会被选为死锁受害者并终止。这通常会选择运行时间最长的事务（或资历更深的一方）作为胜利者。）

These rules generally suffice to resolve most project disputes. When they do not, fiat of the project leader usually suffices. Disputes that survive both these filters are rare.

这些规则通常足以解决大多数项目争议。如果这些规则无法解决，项目领导者的命令通常可以解决。能同时逃过这两层筛选的争议非常罕见。

Conflicts do not as a rule become serious unless these two criteria ("authority follows responsibility" and "seniority wins") point in different directions, and the authority of the project leader is weak or absent. The most obvious case in which this may occur is a succession dispute following the disappearance of the project lead. I have been in one fight of this kind. It was ugly, painful, protracted, only resolved when all parties became exhausted enough to hand control to an outside person, and I devoutly hope I am never anywhere near anything of the kind again.

通常情况下，冲突不会变得严重，除非这两个标准（"权责相随"和"资历获胜"）指向不同方向，且项目领导者的权威薄弱或不存在。最明显的情况是项目领导者失联后的继任争议。我曾经历过一次这样的冲突，那是一场丑陋、痛苦且漫长的争斗，最终只有在所有各方都筋疲力尽、同意将控制权交给外部人员后才得以解决。我衷心希望自己再也不要遇到这样的事情。

Ultimately, all of these conflict-resolution mechanisms rest on the wider hacker community's willingness to enforce them. The only available enforcement mechanisms are flaming and shunning -- public condemnation of those who break custom, and refusal to cooperate with them after they have done so.

归根结底，所有这些冲突解决机制都依赖于更广泛的黑客社区强制执行它们的意愿。唯一可用的执行机制是指责（flaming）和排斥（shunning）------公开谴责那些违反惯例的人，并在他们这样做后拒绝与他们合作。

18. Acculturation Mechanisms and the Link to Academia

18. 文化适应机制与学术界的联系

An early version of this paper posed the following research question: How does the community inform and instruct its members as to its customs? Are the customs self-evident or self-organizing at a semi-conscious level, are they taught by example, are they taught by explicit instruction?

本文的早期版本提出了以下研究问题：社区如何向其成员告知和传授其惯例？这些惯例是不言自明的、在半意识层面自组织形成的，还是通过榜样示范或明确指导传授的？

Teaching by explicit instruction is clearly rare, if only because few explicit descriptions of the culture's norms have existed to be used up to now.

明确指导的传授方式显然很少见，至少因为到目前为止，关于该文化规范的明确描述寥寥无几。

Many norms are taught by example. To cite one very simple case, there is a norm that every software distribution should have a file called README or READ.ME that contains first-look instructions for browsing the distribution. This convention has been well established since at least the early 1980s; it has even, occasionally, been written down. But one normally derives it from looking at many distributions.

许多规范是通过榜样示范传授的。举一个非常简单的例子：存在这样一种规范，每个软件分发包都应包含一个名为 README 或 READ.ME 的文件，其中包含浏览该分发包的初步说明。这一惯例至少自 20 世纪 80 年代初就已确立，甚至偶尔还被写下来过。但人们通常是通过查看许多分发包而习得这一惯例的。

On the other hand, some hacker customs are self-organizing once one has acquired a basic (perhaps unconscious) understanding of the reputation game. Most hackers never have to be taught the three taboos I listed earlier in this paper, or at least would claim if asked that they are self-evident rather than transmitted. This phenomenon invites closer analysis -- and perhaps we can find its explanation in the process by which hackers acquire knowledge about the culture.

另一方面，一旦一个人对声誉游戏有了基本（或许是无意识）的理解，一些黑客惯例就会自组织形成。大多数黑客从未被专门教授过我在本文前面列出的三个禁忌，或者至少在被问及此事时会声称，这些禁忌是不言自明的，而非通过传授获得的。这一现象值得深入分析------或许我们可以在黑客习得该文化知识的过程中找到解释。

Many cultures use hidden clues (more precisely 'mysteries' in the religio/mystical sense) as an acculturation mechanism. These are secrets which are not revealed to outsiders, but are expected to be discovered or deduced by the aspiring newbie. To be accepted inside, one must demonstrate that one both understands the mystery and has learned it in a culturally approved way.

许多文化将隐藏线索（更准确地说是宗教/神秘意义上的"奥秘"）用作文化适应机制。这些秘密不对外人透露，但期望有抱负的新手自己去发现或推断。要被内部接纳，一个人必须证明自己既理解了这些奥秘，又以文化认可的方式习得它们。

The hacker culture makes unusually conscious and extensive use of such clues or tests. We can see this process operating at at least three levels:

黑客文化异常有意识且广泛地使用这种线索或测试。我们可以看到这一过程至少在三个层面上运作：

• Password-like specific mysteries. As one example, there is a USENET newsgroup called alt.sysadmin.recovery that has a very explicit such secret; you cannot post without knowing it, and knowing it is considered evidence you are fit to post. The regulars have a strong taboo against revealing this secret.
  类似密码的特定奥秘。例如，有一个名为 alt.sysadmin.recovery 的 USENET 新闻组，它有一个非常明确的此类秘密；不知道这个秘密就无法在该组发帖，而知道这个秘密被视为你有资格发帖的证据。该组的常客有强烈的禁忌，不泄露这个秘密。
• The requirement of initiation into certain technical mysteries. One must absorb a good deal of technical knowledge before one can give valued gifts (e.g. one must know at least one of the major computer languages). This requirement functions in the large in the way hidden clues do in the small, as a filter for qualities (such as capability for abstract thinking, persistence, and mental flexibility) which are necessary to function in the culture.
  入门需掌握特定技术奥秘的要求。一个人必须掌握大量技术知识，才能提供有价值的礼物（例如，必须至少掌握一种主要的计算机语言）。这一要求在宏观层面上的作用，类似于隐藏线索在微观层面上的作用------它是一种筛选机制，筛选出在该文化中运作所必需的品质（如抽象思维能力、毅力和思维灵活性）。
• Social-context mysteries. One becomes involved in the culture through attaching oneself to specific projects. Each project is a live social context of hackers which the would-be contributor has to investigate and understand socially as well as technically in order to function. (Concretely, a common way one does this is by reading the project's Web pages and/or email archives.) It is through these project groups that newbies experience the behavioral example of experienced hackers.
  社会背景奥秘。一个人通过加入特定项目来融入该文化。每个项目都是黑客的鲜活社会环境，潜在贡献者必须从社会和技术两个方面进行调查和理解，才能在其中发挥作用。（具体来说，一种常见的方式是阅读项目的网页和/或邮件档案。）新手正是通过这些项目组，体验资深黑客的行为榜样。

In the process of acquiring these mysteries, the would-be hacker picks up contextual knowledge which (after a while) does make the three taboos and other customs seem 'self-evident'.

在习得这些奥秘的过程中，潜在的黑客会掌握相关的背景知识，这些知识（一段时间后）会让那三个禁忌和其他惯例看起来"不言自明"。

One might, incidentally, argue that the structure of the hacker gift culture itself is its own central mystery. One is not considered acculturated (concretely: no one will call you a hacker) until one demonstrates a gut-level understanding of the reputation game and its implied customs, taboos, and usages. But this is trivial; all cultures demand such understanding from would-be joiners. Furthermore the hacker culture evinces no desire to have its internal logic and folkways kept secret -- or, at least, nobody has ever flamed me for revealing them!

顺便说一句，有人可能会认为，黑客礼物文化的结构本身就是其核心奥秘。一个人只有在从直觉上理解了声誉游戏及其隐含的惯例、禁忌和用法后，才会被视为融入了该文化（具体来说：才会有人称你为黑客）。但这是微不足道的------所有文化都要求潜在加入者具备这种理解。此外，黑客文化并不希望其内部逻辑和习俗被保密------至少，从未有人因为我揭示了这些而指责我！

Respondents to this paper too numerous to list have pointed out that hacker ownership customs seem intimately related to (and may derive directly from) the practices of the academic world, especially the scientific research community. This research community has similar problems in mining a territory of potentially productive ideas, and exhibits very similar adaptive solutions to those problems in the ways it uses peer review and reputation.

数不胜数的本文反馈者指出，黑客的所有权惯例似乎与学术界（尤其是科研界）的做法密切相关（甚至可能直接源于此）。科研界在挖掘潜在有价值的思想领域时面临着类似的问题，并且在使用同行评审和声誉的方式上，展现出了非常相似的适应性解决方案。

Since many hackers have had formative exposure to academia (it's common to learn how to hack while in college) the extent to which academia shares adaptive patterns with the hacker culture is of more than casual interest in understanding how these customs are applied.

由于许多黑客在成长过程中接触过学术界（在大学里学习黑客技术是很常见的），因此了解学术界与黑客文化共享的适应性模式，对于理解这些惯例的应用方式具有重要意义，而非仅仅是偶然的兴趣。

Obvious parallels with the hacker 'gift culture' as I have characterized it abound in academia. Once a researcher achieves tenure, there is no need to worry about survival issues. (Indeed, the concept of tenure can probably be traced back to an earlier gift culture in which "natural philosophers" were primarily wealthy gentlemen with time on their hands to devote to research.) In the absence of survival issues, reputation enhancement becomes the driving goal, which encourages sharing of new ideas and research through journals and other media. This makes objective functional sense because scientific research, like the hacker culture, relies heavily on the idea of 'standing upon the shoulders of giants', and not having to rediscover basic principles over and over again.

学术界与我所描述的黑客"礼物文化"之间存在着明显的相似之处，且比比皆是。一旦研究人员获得终身教职，就无需担心生存问题。（事实上，终身教职的概念很可能可以追溯到早期的一种礼物文化，在那种文化中，"自然哲学家"主要是有时间致力于研究的富裕绅士。）在没有生存问题的情况下，提升声誉成为核心目标，这鼓励通过期刊和其他媒体分享新思想和研究成果。这在客观功能上是合理的，因为科学研究与黑客文化一样，在很大程度上依赖于"站在巨人的肩膀上"这一理念，无需反复重新发现基本原理。

Some have gone so far as to suggest that hacker customs are merely a reflection of the research community's folkways and have actually (in most cases) been acquired there by individual hackers. This probably overstates the case, if only because hacker custom seems to be readily acquired by intelligent high-schoolers!

有些人甚至认为，黑客惯例仅仅是科研界习俗的反映，且实际上（在大多数情况下）是个体黑客在学术界习得的。这可能夸大了事实，至少因为聪明的高中生似乎也能轻易习得黑客惯例！

19. Gift Outcompetes Exchange

19. 礼物文化优于交换文化

There is a more interesting possibility here. I suspect academia and the hacker culture share adaptive patterns not because they're genetically related, but because they've both evolved the one most optimal social organization for what they're trying to do, given the laws of nature and the instinctive wiring of human beings. The verdict of history seems to be that free-market capitalism is the globally optimal way to cooperate for economic efficiency; perhaps, in a similar way, the reputation-game gift culture is the globally optimal way to cooperate for generating (and checking!) high-quality creative work.

这里存在一种更有趣的可能性。我怀疑，学术界和黑客文化共享适应性模式，并非因为它们有"基因上"的关联，而是因为考虑到自然规律和人类的本能倾向，它们都进化出了最适合自身目标的社会组织形式。历史的结论似乎是，自由市场资本主义是实现经济效率的全球最优合作方式；或许，类似地，声誉游戏礼物文化是产生（并检验！）高质量创造性工作的全球最优合作方式。

Support for this theory comes from a large body of psychological studies on the interaction between art and reward [GNU]. These studies have received less attention than they should, in part perhaps because their popularizers have shown a tendency to overinterpret them into general attacks against the free market and intellectual property. Nevertheless, their results do suggest that some kinds of scarcity-economics rewards actually decrease the productivity of creative workers such as programmers.

这一理论得到了大量关于艺术与奖励相互作用的心理学研究的支持[GNU]。这些研究没有得到应有的关注，部分原因可能是其普及者倾向于过度解读它们，将其转化为对自由市场和知识产权的普遍攻击。尽管如此，研究结果确实表明，某些稀缺性经济奖励实际上会降低程序员等创造性工作者的生产力。

Psychologist Theresa Amabile of Brandeis University, cautiously summarizing the results of a 1984 study of motivation and reward, observed "It may be that commissioned work will, in general, be less creative than work that is done out of pure interest.". Amabile goes on to observe that "The more complex the activity, the more it's hurt by extrinsic reward." Interestingly, the studies suggest that flat salaries don't demotivate, but piecework rates and bonuses do.

布兰迪斯大学的心理学家特蕾莎·阿马比尔在谨慎总结 1984 年一项关于动机与奖励的研究结果时指出："总的来说，受委托的工作可能不如出于纯粹兴趣的工作有创造性。" 阿马比尔进一步指出："活动越复杂，受外在奖励的伤害就越大。" 有趣的是，研究表明，固定工资不会降低积极性，但计件工资和奖金会。

Thus, it may be economically smart to give performance bonuses to people who flip burgers or dig ditches, but it's probably smarter to decouple salary from performance in a programming shop and let people choose their own projects (both trends that the open-source world takes to their logical conclusions). Indeed, these results suggest that the only time it is a good idea to reward performance in programming is when the programmer is so motivated that he or she would have worked without the reward!

因此，给翻转汉堡或挖沟的人发放绩效奖金在经济上可能是明智的，但在编程工作室中，将工资与绩效脱钩并让员工自主选择项目可能更为明智（这两种趋势在开源世界中都得到了逻辑上的极致体现）。事实上，这些研究结果表明，在编程领域奖励绩效的唯一合适时机，是当程序员的内在动机足够强烈，即便没有奖励也会投入工作的时候！

Other researchers in the field are willing to point a finger straight at the issues of autonomy and creative control that so preoccupy hackers. "To the extent one's experience of being self-determined is limited," said Richard Ryan, associate psychology professor at the University of Rochester, "one's creativity will be reduced as well."

该领域的其他研究人员则直接指出了黑客们极为关注的自主权和创造性控制权问题。罗切斯特大学心理学副教授理查德·瑞安表示："一个人的自主体验越受限制，其创造力也会随之降低。"

In general, presenting any task as a means rather than an end in itself seems to demotivate. Even winning a competition with others or gaining peer esteem can be demotivating in this way if it is experienced as work for reward (which may explain why hackers are culturally prohibited from explicitly seeking or claiming that esteem).

总的来说，将任何任务视为达成目的的手段而非目的本身，似乎都会降低积极性。即便与他人竞争获胜或获得同行认可，如果这种行为被视为"为了奖励而工作"，也可能以这种方式削弱积极性（这或许可以解释为何黑客文化禁止人们明确追求或宣称这种认可）。

To complicate the management problem further, controlling verbal feedback seems to be just as demotivating as piecework payment. Ryan found that corporate employees who were told, "Good, you're doing as you should" were "significantly less intrinsically motivated than those who received feedback informationally."

更让管理问题复杂化的是，带有控制性质的口头反馈似乎与计件工资一样会降低积极性。瑞安发现，那些听到"很好，你按要求完成了"的企业员工，"其内在动机显著低于那些收到纯信息性反馈的员工"。

It may still be intelligent to offer incentives, but they have to come without attachments to avoid gumming up the works. There is a critical difference (Ryan observes) between saying, "I'm giving you this reward because I recognize the value of your work" and "You're getting this reward because you've lived up to my standards." The first does not demotivate; the second does.

提供激励或许仍然是明智的，但这些激励必须不带附加条件，以免影响工作进展。瑞安指出，"我给你这份奖励是因为我认可你工作的价值"与"你得到这份奖励是因为你达到了我的标准"这两种说法之间存在关键区别：前者不会降低积极性，而后者会。

In these psychological observations we can ground a case that an open-source development group will be substantially more productive (especially over the long term, in which creativity becomes more critical as a productivity multiplier) than an equivalently sized and skilled group of closed-source programmers (de)motivated by scarcity rewards.

从这些心理学观察中，我们可以得出一个结论：一个开源开发团队的生产力将显著高于规模和技能相当、受稀缺性奖励驱动（或削弱积极性）的闭源程序员团队------尤其是在长期来看，创造力作为生产力倍增器的作用会愈发关键。

This suggests from a slightly different angle one of the speculations in The Cathedral And The Bazaar; that, ultimately, the industrial/factory mode of software production was doomed to be outcompeted from the moment capitalism began to create enough of a wealth surplus that many programmers could live in a post-scarcity gift culture.

这从一个略有不同的角度印证了《大教堂与集市》中的一个推测：归根结底，从资本主义创造出足够的财富盈余、使许多程序员能够生活在后稀缺礼物文化中的那一刻起，工业化/工厂式的软件生产模式就注定会被超越。

Indeed, it seems the prescription for highest software productivity is almost a Zen paradox; if you want the most efficient production, you must give up trying to make programmers produce. Handle their subsistence, give them their heads, and forget about deadlines. To a conventional manager this sounds crazily indulgent and doomed -- but it is exactly the recipe with which the open-source culture is now clobbering its competition.

事实上，实现最高软件生产力的方案几乎是一个禅宗式的悖论：如果你想要最高效的生产，就必须放弃强迫程序员产出的尝试。解决他们的生计问题，给予他们自主权，忘掉截止日期。对于传统管理者来说，这听起来既疯狂放纵又注定失败------但这正是开源文化如今击败竞争对手的秘诀。

20. Conclusion: From Custom to Customary Law

20. 结论：从惯例到习惯法

We have examined the customs which regulate the ownership and control of open-source software. We have seen how they imply an underlying theory of property rights homologous to the Lockean theory of land tenure. We have related that to an analysis of the hacker culture as a 'gift culture' in which participants compete for prestige by giving time, energy, and creativity away. We have examined the implications of this analysis for conflict resolution in the culture.

我们探讨了规范开源软件所有权与控制权的惯例，发现这些惯例蕴含着一种与洛克式土地所有权理论同源的产权理论。我们将这一理论与黑客文化的分析相结合，指出黑客文化是一种"礼物文化"------参与者通过奉献时间、精力和创造力来争夺声望。我们还探讨了这一分析对该文化中冲突解决的意义。

The next logical question to ask is "Why does this matter?" Hackers developed these customs without conscious analysis and (up to now) have followed them without conscious analysis. It's not immediately clear that conscious analysis has gained us anything practical -- unless, perhaps, we can move from description to prescription and deduce ways to improve the functioning of these customs.

接下来合乎逻辑的问题是："这为何重要？" 黑客们在无意识分析的情况下形成了这些惯例，并且（到目前为止）一直在无意识分析的情况下遵循它们。有意识的分析是否能为我们带来实际价值，这一点并非一目了然------除非我们能从描述转向规范，推导出改善这些惯例运作的方法。

We have found a close logical analogy for hacker customs in the theory of land tenure under the Anglo-American common-law tradition. Historically [Miller], the European tribal cultures that invented this tradition improved their dispute-resolution systems by moving from a system of unarticulated, semi-conscious custom to a body of explicit customary law memorized by tribal wisemen -- and eventually, written down.

我们发现，黑客惯例与英美普通法传统中的土地所有权理论存在密切的逻辑类比。从历史上看[米勒]，发明这一传统的欧洲部落文化通过将未明确表述的、半意识的惯例体系，转变为由部落智者记忆、并最终书面化的明确习惯法体系，完善了其冲突解决机制。

Perhaps, as our population rises and acculturation of all new members becomes more difficult, it is time for the hacker culture to do something analogous -- to develop written codes of good practice for resolving the various sorts of disputes that can arise in connection with open-source projects, and a tradition of arbitration in which senior members of the community may be asked to mediate disputes.

或许，随着黑客群体规模扩大，让所有新成员融入文化变得愈发困难，现在是时候让黑客文化采取类似的行动了------制定书面的良好实践准则，以解决与开源项目相关的各类纠纷，并建立一种仲裁传统，邀请社区资深成员调解纠纷。

The analysis in this paper suggests the outlines of what such a code might look like, making explicit that which was previously implicit. No such codes could be imposed from above; they would have to be voluntarily adopted by the founders or owners of individual projects. Nor could they be completely rigid, as the pressures on the culture are likely to change over time. Finally, for enforcement of such codes to work, they would have to reflect a broad consensus of the hacker tribe.

本文的分析为这类准则的框架提供了思路，将此前隐含的内容明确化。此类准则不能自上而下强制推行，而必须由各个项目的创始人或所有者自愿采纳。它们也不能完全僵化，因为文化所面临的压力可能会随时间变化。最后，要使这类准则的执行有效，它们必须反映黑客群体的广泛共识。

I have begun work on such a code, tentatively titled the "Malvern Protocol" after the little town where I live. If the general analysis in this paper becomes sufficiently widely accepted, I will make the Malvern Protocol publicly available as a model code for dispute resolution. Parties interested in critiquing and developing this code, or just offering feedback on whether they think it's a good idea or not, are invited to contact me by email (mailto:esr@thyrsus.com).

我已经开始着手制定这样一套准则，暂定名为《马尔文协议》（Malvern Protocol），以我居住的小镇命名。如果本文的总体分析获得足够广泛的认可，我将公开《马尔文协议》，将其作为纠纷解决的示范准则。欢迎有兴趣对该准则进行评论、完善，或就其可行性提供反馈的人士通过电子邮件与我联系（mailto:esr@thyrsus.com）。

21. Questions for Further Research

21. 有待进一步研究的问题

The culture's (and my own) understanding of large projects that don't follow a benevolent-dictator model is weak. Most such projects fail. A few become spectacularly successful and important (Perl, Apache, KDE). Nobody really understands where the difference lies. There's a vague sense abroad that each such project is sui generis and stands or falls on the group dynamic of its particular members, but is this true or are there replicable strategies a group can follow?

无论是黑客文化（还是我个人），对不遵循"仁慈的独裁者"模式的大型项目的理解都很有限。大多数此类项目都以失败告终，但也有少数项目取得了惊人的成功并具有重要意义（如 Perl、Apache、KDE）。没有人真正明白其中的差异所在。人们普遍有一种模糊的看法，认为每个此类项目都是独特的，其成败取决于特定成员的群体动态，但事实果真如此吗？或者说，是否存在可供团队遵循的可复制策略？

22. Bibliography

22. 参考文献

Miller\] Miller, William Ian; Bloodtaking and Peacemaking: Feud, Law, and Society in Saga Iceland; University of Chicago Press 1990, ISBN 0-226-52680-1. A fascinating study of Icelandic folkmoot law, which both illuminates the ancestry of the Lockean theory of property and describes the later stages of a historical process by which custom passed into customary law and thence to written law. \[米勒\] 威廉·伊恩·米勒；《复仇与和解：冰岛萨迦中的世仇、法律与社会》；芝加哥大学出版社 1990 年版，ISBN 0-226-52680-1。该书对冰岛民众集会法进行了引人入胜的研究，既阐明了洛克式产权理论的起源，也描述了惯例逐步演变为习惯法、进而形成成文法的历史进程。 \[Mal\] Malaclypse the Younger; Principia Discordia, or How I Found Goddess and What I Did To Her When I Found Her; Loompanics, ISBN 1-55950-040-9. There is much enlightening silliness to be found in Discordianism. Amidst it, the 'SNAFU principle' provides a rather trenchant analysis of why command hierarchies don't scale well. \[马尔\] 小马拉科利普斯；《混沌原理》（Principia Discordia, or How I Found Goddess and What I Did To Her When I Found Her）；卢姆潘尼克斯出版社，ISBN 1-55950-040-9。混沌教中存在许多富有启发性的荒诞内容，其中"混乱原则"（SNAFU principle）对命令层级制难以扩展的原因进行了相当深刻的分析。 \[BCT\] J. Barkow, L. Cosmides, and J. Tooby (Eds.); The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture. New York: Oxford University Press 1992. An excellent introduction to evolutionary psychology. Some of the papers bear directly on the three cultural types I discuss (command/exchange/gift), suggesting that these patterns are wired into the human psyche fairly deep. \[BCT\] J·巴科、L·科斯米德斯、J·图比（编）；《适应的心智：进化心理学与文化的产生》；纽约：牛津大学出版社 1992 年版。这是进化心理学的优秀入门读物，其中部分论文直接涉及我所讨论的三种文化类型（命令型/交换型/礼物型），表明这些模式已深深植根于人类心理。 \[MHG\] Goldhaber, Michael K.; The Attention Economy and the Net. I discovered this paper after my version 1.7. It has obvious flaws (Goldhaber's argument for the inapplicability of economic reasoning to attention does not bear close examination), but Goldhaber nevertheless has funny and perceptive things to say about the role of attention-seeking in organizing behavior. The prestige or peer repute I have discussed can fruitfully be viewed as a particular case of attention in his sense. \[MHG\] 迈克尔·K·戈德哈伯；《注意力经济与网络》。我在本文 1.7 版本之后发现了这篇论文。它存在明显缺陷（戈德哈伯关于经济推理不适用于注意力的论点经不起仔细推敲），但戈德哈伯对注意力追求在组织行为中的作用提出了许多有趣且富有洞察力的观点。我所讨论的声望或同行认可，可以有效地被视为他所定义的"注意力"的一种特殊情况。 ## 23. Endnotes ## 23. 注释 \[N\] The term 'noosphere' is an obscure term of art in philosophy. It is pronounced KNOW-uh-sfeer (two o-sounds, one long and stressed, one short and unstressed tending towards schwa). If one is being excruciatingly correct about one's orthography, it is properly spelled with a diaresis over the second 'o' to mark it as a separate vowel. \[N\] "智域"（noosphere）是哲学中一个生僻的专业术语，发音为 KNOW-uh-sfeer（包含两个"o"音，一个长音且重读，一个短音且轻读，接近中元音）。如果要严格遵循拼写规范，第二个"o"上方应加分音符，以标明其为独立元音。 In more detail; this term for "the sphere of human thought" derives from the Greek 'nous' meaning 'mind', 'spirit', or 'breath'. It was invented by E. LeRoy in Les origines humaines et l'evolution de l'intelligence (Paris 1928). It was popularized first by the Russian biologist and pioneering ecologist Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky, (1863-1945), then by the Jesuit paleontologist/philosopher Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955). It is with de Chardin's theory of future human evolution to a form of pure mind culminating in union with the Godhead that the term is now primarily associated. 具体来说，这个表示"人类思想领域"的术语源自希腊语"nous"，意为"心智""精神"或"气息"。它由 E·勒鲁在《人类起源与智力进化》（Les origines humaines et l'evolution de l'intelligence，巴黎 1928 年版）中创造，先是由俄罗斯生物学家、先驱生态学家弗拉基米尔·伊万诺维奇·维尔纳茨基（1863-1945）推广，后来又经耶稣会古生物学家/哲学家皮埃尔·泰亚尔·德·夏尔丹（1881-1955）传播开来。如今，该术语主要与德·夏尔丹的理论相关联------他认为人类未来将进化为纯粹的心智形式，并最终与神性合一。 \[DF\] David Friedman, one of the most lucid and accessible thinkers in contemporary economics, has written an excellent outline of the history and logic of intellectual-property law. I recommend it as a starting point to anyone interested in these issues. \[DF\] 大卫·弗里德曼是当代经济学中最清晰易懂的思想家之一，他撰写了一篇关于知识产权法历史与逻辑的精彩概述。我向所有对这些问题感兴趣的人推荐这篇文章，将其作为入门读物。 \[SP\] One interesting difference between the Linux and BSD worlds is that the Linux kernel (and associated OS core utilities) have never forked, but BSD's has, at least three times. What makes this interesting is that the social structure of the BSD groups is centralized in a way intended to define clear lines of authority and to prevent forking, while the decentralized and amorphous Linux community takes no such measures. It appears that the projects which open up development the most actually have the least tendency to fork! \[SP\] Linux 和 BSD 世界之间一个有趣的差异是：Linux 内核（及相关操作系统核心工具）从未出现过分支，但 BSD 内核至少出现过三次分支。有趣的是，BSD 团队的社会结构是集中式的，旨在明确权力界限并防止分支，而分散且松散的 Linux 社区却没有采取此类措施。这似乎表明，开发过程最开放的项目，实际上分支倾向最弱！ Henry Spencer (henry@spsystems.net) suggests that, in general, the stability of a political system is inversely proportional to the height of the entry barriers to its political process. His analysis is worth quoting here: 亨利·斯宾塞（henry@spsystems.net）提出，一般来说，一个政治系统的稳定性与其政治进程的准入门槛高度成反比。他的分析值得在此引用： One major strength of a relatively open democracy is that most potential revolutionaries find it easier to make progress toward their objectives by working via the system rather by attacking it. This strength is easily undermined if established parties act together to 'raise the bar', making it more difficult for small dissatisfied groups to see some progress made toward their goals. 相对开放的民主制度的一个主要优势是，大多数潜在的革命者会发现，通过制度内部运作来实现目标比攻击制度更容易。但如果现有政党联合起来"提高门槛"，让不满的小群体难以看到目标取得进展，这种优势就很容易被削弱。 (A similar principle can be found in economics. Open markets have the strongest competition, and generally the best and cheapest products. Because of this, it's very much in the best interests of established companies to make market entry more difficult -- for example, by convincing governments to require elaborate RFI testing on computers, or by creating 'consensus' standards which are so complex that they cannot be implemented effectively from scratch without large resources. The markets with the strongest entry barriers are the ones that come under the strongest attack from revolutionaries, e.g. the Internet and the Justice Dept. vs. the Bell System.) （经济学中也存在类似原则。开放市场的竞争最激烈，通常能产出最好、最便宜的产品。正因如此，现有企业的最大利益所在，就是提高市场准入难度------例如，说服政府要求计算机进行复杂的射频干扰测试，或制定极为复杂的"共识"标准，使得没有大量资源就无法从零开始有效实施。准入门槛最高的市场，往往受到革命者的攻击也最猛烈，例如互联网领域以及美国司法部对贝尔系统的诉讼。） An open process with low entry barriers encourages participation rather than secession, because one can get results without the high overheads of secession. The results may not be as impressive as what could be achieved by seceding, but they come at a lower price, and most people will consider that an acceptable tradeoff. (When the Spanish government revoked Franco's anti-Basque laws and offered the Basque provinces their own schools and limited local autonomy, most of the Basque Separatist movement evaporated almost overnight. Only the hard-core Marxists insisted that it wasn't good enough.) 准入门槛低的开放流程会鼓励参与而非分裂，因为人们无需承担分裂带来的高额成本就能取得成果。这些成果可能不如分裂所能达成的那样显著，但代价更低，大多数人会认为这是可接受的权衡。（当西班牙政府废除佛朗哥时期的反巴斯克法律，允许巴斯克地区设立自己的学校并给予有限地方自治权时，大多数巴斯克分离主义运动几乎在一夜之间销声匿迹，只有核心马克思主义者坚持认为这还不够。） \[RP\] There are some subtleties about rogue patches. One can divide them into 'friendly' and 'unfriendly' types. A 'friendly' patch is designed to be merged back into the project's main-line sources under the maintainer's control (whether or not that merge actually happens); an 'unfriendly' one is intended to yank the project in a direction the maintainer doesn't approve. Some projects (notably the Linux kernel itself) are pretty relaxed about friendly patches and even encourage independent distribution of them as part of their beta-test phase. An unfriendly patch, on the other hand, represents a decision to compete with the original and is a serious matter. Maintaining a whole raft of unfriendly patches tends to lead to forking. \[RP\] 非官方补丁存在一些微妙之处，可分为"友好型"和"不友好型"两类。"友好型"补丁旨在在维护者的控制下合并回项目主线源代码（无论合并是否实际发生）；"不友好型"补丁则意图将项目引向维护者不认可的方向。一些项目（尤其是 Linux 内核本身）对友好型补丁持相当宽松的态度，甚至鼓励在测试阶段独立分发这些补丁。而不友好型补丁则意味着决定与原版项目竞争，是一件严肃的事情------维护大量不友好型补丁往往会导致项目分支。 \[LW\] I am indebted to Michael Funk (mwfunk@uncc.campus.mci.net) for pointing out how instructive a contrast with hackers the pirate culture is. Linus Walleij has posted an analysis of their cultural dynamics that differs from mine (describing them as a scarcity culture) in A Comment on 'Warez D00dz' Culture. \[LW\] 我要感谢迈克尔·芬克（mwfunk@uncc.campus.mci.net）指出，海盗文化与黑客文化的对比具有很强的启发意义。林纳斯·瓦莱伊在《关于"软件盗版者群体"文化的评论》（A Comment on 'Warez D00dz' Culture）中发表了对其文化动态的分析，与我的观点不同（他将其描述为稀缺性文化）。 The contrast may not last. Former cracker Andrej Brandt (andy@pilgrim.cs.net.pl) reports that he believes the cracker/warez d00dz culture is now withering away, with its brightest people and leaders assimilating to the open-source world. Independent evidence for this view may be provided by a precedent-breaking July 1999 action of the cracker group calling itself 'Cult of the Dead Cow'. They have released their 'Back Orifice 2000' for breaking Microsoft Windows security tools under the GPL. 这种对比可能不会持续下去。前破解者安德烈·勃兰特（andy@pilgrim.cs.net.pl）表示，他认为破解者/软件盗版者群体文化正在消亡，其最优秀的人才和领导者正融入开源世界。1999 年 7 月，一个自称"死牛崇拜"（Cult of the Dead Cow）的破解者团体采取了开创性行动，为这一观点提供了独立证据------他们根据 GPL 协议发布了用于破解微软 Windows 安全工具的"Back Orifice 2000"。 \[HT\] In evolutionary terms, the craftsman's urge itself may (like internalized ethics) be a result of the high risk and cost of deception. Evolutionary psychologists have collected experimental evidence \[BCT\] that human beings have brain logic specialized for detecting social deceptions, and it is fairly easy to see why our ancestors should have been selected for ability to detect cheating. Therefore, if one wishes to have a reputation for personality traits which confer advantage but are risky or costly, it may actually be better tactics to actually have these traits than to fake them. ("Honesty is the best policy") \[HT\] 从进化角度来看，工匠的追求本身（如同内化的道德准则）可能是欺骗行为高风险和高成本的结果。进化心理学家收集的实验证据\[BCT\]表明，人类大脑具有专门检测社会欺骗的逻辑机制，我们的祖先之所以被筛选出欺骗检测能力，原因显而易见。因此，如果一个人希望获得具有优势但存在风险或成本的人格特质声誉，实际拥有这些特质可能比伪装它们更明智（即"诚实是最好的策略"）。 Evolutionary psychologists have suggested that this explains behavior like barroom fights. Among younger adult male humans, having a reputation for 'toughness' is both socially and (even in today's feminist-influenced climate) sexually useful. Faking "toughness", however, is extremely risky; the negative result of being found out leaves one in a worse position than never having claimed the trait. The cost of deception is so high that it is sometimes better minimaxing to internalize 'toughness' and risk serious injury in a fight to prove it. Parallel observations have been made about less controversial traits like 'honesty'. 进化心理学家认为，这可以解释酒吧斗殴等行为。在年轻成年男性中，"强悍"的声誉在社交上（甚至在如今受女权主义影响的环境中）在两性关系上都具有价值。然而，伪装"强悍"风险极高------一旦被揭穿，后果比从未声称过这一特质更糟。欺骗的成本如此之高，以至于有时最优策略是内化"强悍"特质，并冒着在斗殴中受重伤的风险来证明它。对于"诚实"等争议较小的特质，也存在类似观察结果。 Though the primary meditation-like rewards of creative work should not be underestimated, the craftsman's urge is probably at least in part just such an internalization (where the base trait is 'capacity for painstaking work' or something similar). 尽管创造性工作带来的类似冥想的主要回报不应被低估，但工匠的追求可能至少在一定程度上是这种内化的结果（其核心特质是"刻苦工作的能力"或类似品质）。 \[MH\] A concise summary of Maslow's hierarchy and related theories is available on the Web at Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs. \[MH\] 关于马斯洛需求层次理论及相关理论的简明摘要，可在网络上的"马斯洛需求层次"（Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs）页面查阅。 \[DC\] However, demanding humility from leaders may be a more general characteristic of gift or abundance cultures. David Christie (dc@netscape.com) reports on a trip through the outer islands of Fiji: "In Fijian village chiefs, we observed the same sort of self-deprecating, low-key leadership style that you attribute to open source project leaders. \[...\] Though accorded great respect and of course all of whatever actual power there is in Fiji, the chiefs we met demonstrated genuine humility and often a saint-like acceptance of their duty. This is particularly interesting given that being chief is a hereditary role, not an elected position or a popularity contest. Somehow they are trained to it by the culture itself, although they are born to it, not chosen by their peers." He goes on to emphasize that he believes the characteristic style of Fijian chiefs springs from the difficulty of compelling cooperation: a chief has "no big carrot or big stick". \[DC\] 然而，要求领导者保持谦逊可能是礼物文化或富足文化的一个更普遍特征。大卫·克里斯蒂（dc@netscape.com）在斐济外岛旅行时报告称："在斐济村庄酋长身上，我们观察到了你所描述的开源项目领导者那种自我贬低、低调的领导风格。......尽管他们受到极大尊重，并且拥有斐济境内所有实际权力，但我们遇到的酋长们展现出了真正的谦逊，往往以圣人般的态度接受自己的职责。这一点尤其有趣，因为酋长是世袭职位，而非选举产生或人气竞争的结果。尽管他们生来就是酋长，而非由同行选择，但不知何故，文化本身会培养他们形成这种风格。" 他进一步强调，他认为斐济酋长的独特风格源于强制合作的难度：酋长"既没有大的奖励，也没有大的惩罚手段"（no big carrot or big stick）。 \[NO\] As a matter of observable fact, people who found successful projects gather more prestige than people who do arguably equal amounts of work debugging and assisting with successful projects. An earlier version of this paper asked "Is this a rational valuation of comparative effort, or is it a second-order effect of the unconscious territorial model we have adduced here?" Several respondents suggested persuasive and essentially equivalent theories. The following analysis by Ryan Waldron (rew@erebor.com) puts the case well: \[NO\] 作为可观察的事实，创建成功项目的人比那些在成功项目中从事调试和辅助工作、付出相当工作量的人获得更多声望。本文早期版本曾提出一个问题："这是对相对努力的理性评估，还是我们在此提出的无意识领地模型的二阶效应？" 多位反馈者提出了具有说服力且本质上相同的理论，以下是瑞安·沃尔德伦（rew@erebor.com）的分析，很好地阐述了这一点： In the context of the Lockean land theory, one who establishes a new and successful project has essentially discovered or opened up new territory on which others can homestead. For most successful projects, there is a pattern of declining returns, so that after a while, the credit for contributions to a project has become so diffuse that it is hard for significant reputation to accrete to a late participant, regardless of the quality of his work. 在洛克式土地理论的背景下，创建新的成功项目的人，本质上是发现或开拓了新的领地，供他人在此拓荒。对于大多数成功项目来说，存在回报递减的模式------一段时间后，项目贡献的荣誉变得如此分散，以至于后期参与者无论工作质量如何，都难以积累显著声望。 For instance, how good a job would I have to do making modifications to the perl code to have even a fraction of the recognition for my participation that Larry, Tom, Randall, and others have achieved? 例如，我需要对 Perl 代码做出多大改进，才能获得拉里、汤姆、兰德尔等人所获得的参与认可度的一小部分？ However, if a new project is founded \[by someone else\] tomorrow, and I am an early and frequent participant in it, my ability to share in the respect generated by such a successful project is greatly enhanced by my early participation therein (assuming similar quality of contributions). I reckon it to be similar to those who invest in Microsoft stock early and those who invest in it later. Everyone may profit, but early participants profit more. Therefore, at some point I will be more interested in a new and successful IPO than I will be in participating in the continual increase of an existing body of corporate stock. 然而，如果明天有人创建一个新项目，而我是早期且频繁的参与者（假设贡献质量相当），那么早期参与将极大提升我分享该成功项目所带来尊重的能力。我认为这类似于早期投资微软股票与后期投资的区别：每个人都可能获利，但早期参与者获利更多。因此，在某个时刻，我会对一个新的成功"首次公开募股"（IPO）更感兴趣，而非参与现有企业股票的持续增值。 Ryan Waldron's analogy can be extended. The project founder has to sell a new idea like a missionary -- an idea which may or may not be acceptable or of use to others. Thus the founder incurs something analogous to an IPO risk (of possible damage to their reputation), more so than others who assist with a project that has already garnered some acceptance by their peers. The founder's reward is consistent despite the fact that the assistants may be putting in more work in real terms. This is easily seen as analogous to the relationship between risk and rewards in an exchange economy. 瑞安·沃尔德伦的类比可以进一步延伸：项目创始人必须像传教士一样推销一个新想法------这个想法可能被他人接受或利用，也可能不会。因此，创始人承担着类似于首次公开募股（IPO）的风险（可能损害声誉），这种风险比那些在项目已获得同行一定认可后提供协助的人更大。尽管实际上协助者可能付出更多工作，但创始人的回报与之匹配------这很容易被视为与交换经济中风险与回报的关系类似。 Other respondents have observed that our nervous system is tuned to perceive differences, not steady state. The revolutionary change evidenced by the creation of a new project is therefore much more noticeable than the cumulative effect of constant incremental improvement. Thus Linus is revered as the father of Linux, although the net effect of improvements by thousands of other contributors have done more to contribute to the success of the OS than one man's work ever could. 其他反馈者观察到，我们的神经系统善于感知变化，而非稳定状态。因此，创建新项目所体现的革命性变化，比持续增量改进的累积效应更容易被注意到。正因如此，林纳斯被尊为 Linux 之父，尽管数千名其他贡献者的改进所产生的净效应，对该操作系统成功的贡献远超单个人的工作。 \[HD\] The phrase "de-commoditizing" is a reference to the Halloween Documents in which Microsoft used "de-commoditize" quite frankly to refer to their most effective long-term strategy for maintaining an exploitative monopoly lock on customers. \[HD\] "去商品化"（de-commoditizing）一词源自《万圣节文件》（Halloween Documents），微软在其中坦率地将"去商品化"称为其维持对客户的剥削性垄断控制的最有效长期策略。 \[GNU\] The Free Software Foundation's main web site carries an article that summarizes the results of many of these studies. The quotes in this paper are excerpted from there. \[GNU\] 自由软件基金会的主网站刊登了一篇文章，总结了其中许多研究的结果，本文中的引语均摘录自该文章。 ## 24. Acknowledgements ## 24. 致谢 Robert Lanphier (robla@real.com) contributed much to the discussion of egoless behavior. Eric Kidd (eric.kidd@pobox.com) highlighted the role of valuing humility in preventing cults of personality. The section on global effects was inspired by comments from Daniel Burn (daniel@tsathoggua.lab.usyd.edu.au). Mike Whitaker (mrw@entropic.co.uk) inspired the main thread in the section on acculturation. Chris Phoenix (cphoenix@best.com) pointed out the importance of the fact that hackers cannot gain reputation by doing other hackers down. 罗伯特·兰菲尔（robla@real.com）为"无私行为"的讨论提供了大量帮助。埃里克·基德（eric.kidd@pobox.com）强调了重视谦逊在防止个人崇拜方面的作用。"全球影响"章节的灵感来自丹尼尔·伯恩（daniel@tsathoggua.lab.usyd.edu.au）的评论。迈克·惠特克（mrw@entropic.co.uk）启发了"文化适应"章节的主线内容。克里斯·菲尼克斯（cphoenix@best.com）指出了一个重要事实：黑客无法通过贬低其他黑客来获得声望。 I am solely responsible for what has gone into this paper, and any errors or misconceptions. However, I have welcomed comments and feedback and used them to improve the paper -- a process which I do not expect to end at any predefined time. 我对本文的内容以及其中可能存在的任何错误或误解承担全部责任。不过，我一直欢迎各类评论和反馈，并利用它们来完善本文------这一过程不会在任何预定时间结束。 ### About the Author **[Eric S. Raymond](http://www.tuxedo.org/~esr)** has been writing open-source software for more than fifteen years, and has authored or collaborated on many popular programs. He is often described as the Internet hacker culture's tribal historian and resident anthropologist, and edited *The New Hacker's Dictionary* (Third edition; Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996). E-mail: [esr@thyrsus.com](mailto:esr@thyrsus.com) ### Notes ### 注释 1. In discussing 'ownership' in this section I will use the singular, as though all projects are owned by some one person. It should be understood, however, that projects may be owned by groups. We shall examine the internal dynamics of such groups later in this paper. 在本节讨论"所有权"时，我将使用单数形式，仿佛所有项目都由某一个人拥有。然而，应该理解的是，项目可能由群体拥有。我们将在本文后面考察这类群体的内部动态。 2. There are some subtleties about rogue patches. One can divide them into 'friendly' and 'unfriendly' types. A 'friendly' patch is designed to be merged back into the project's main-line sources under the maintainer's control (whether or not that merge actually happens); an 'unfriendly' one is intended to yank the project in a direction the maintainer doesn't approve. Some projects (notably the Linux kernel itself) are pretty relaxed about friendly patches and even encourage independent distribution of them as part of their beta-test phase. An unfriendly patch, on the other hand, represents a decision to compete with the original and is a serious matter. Maintaining a whole raft of unfriendly patches tends to lead to forking. 关于"流氓补丁"（rogue patches）有一些微妙之处。可以将它们分为"友好型"和"不友好型"。一个"友好型"补丁旨在被合并回项目在维护者控制下的主线源代码中（无论该合并是否实际发生）；一个"不友好型"补丁则意在将项目拉向维护者不认可的方向。一些项目（特别是 Linux 内核本身）对友好型补丁相当宽松，甚至鼓励作为其测试阶段的一部分进行独立分发。另一方面，不友好型补丁代表着与原版竞争的决定，是一件严肃的事情。维护大量不友好型补丁往往会导致项目分叉（forking）。 3. The term 'noosphere' is an obscure term of art in philosophy derived from the Greek 'nous' meaning 'mind', 'spirit', or 'breath'. It is pronounced KNOW-uh-sfeer (two o-sounds, one long and stressed, one short and unstressed tending towards schwa). If one is being excruciatingly correct about one's orthography, it is properly spelled with a dieresis over one 'o' - just don't ask me which one. 术语"noosphere"（智慧圈）是哲学中的一个晦涩术语，源自希腊语"nous"，意为"心灵"、"精神"或"呼吸"。其发音为 KNOW-uh-sfeer（两个 o 音，一个长而重读，一个短而弱读，趋向于中央元音）。如果有人在拼写上极其讲究，正确的拼写应该在一个"o"上加变音符号------只是别问我该加在哪个上面。 4. *Principia Discordia, Or, How I Found Goddess and What I Did to Her When I Found Her: The Magnum Opiate of Malacypse the Younger.* 2nd edition. Port Townsend, Wash.: Loompanics, 1980. Amidst much enlightening silliness, the 'SNAFU principle' provides a rather trenchant analysis of why command hierarchies don't scale well. There's a browsable HTML version. *Principia Discordia*，或《我如何找到女神以及找到她后对她做了什么：小马拉凯普斯的伟大鸦片》。第 2 版。华盛顿州汤森港：Loompanics，1980 年。在众多富有启发性的荒谬之中，"SNAFU 原则"对为什么命令式层级结构难以扩展提供了相当犀利的分析。有一个可浏览的 HTML 版本。 5. I have summarized the history of hackerdom at http://earthspace.net/\~esr/faqs/hacker-hist.html. The book that will explain it really well remains to be written, probably not by me. 我在 http://earthspace.net/\~esr/faqs/hacker-hist.html 总结了黑客文化的历史。能真正解释清楚它的书还有待撰写，大概不会是我写的。 6. William Ian Miller, 1990. *Bloodtaking and Peacemaking: Feud, Law, and Society in Saga Iceland.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press. A fascinating study of Icelandic folkmoot law, which both illuminates the ancestry of the Lockean theory of property and describes the later stages of a historical process by which custom passed into customary law and thence to written law. William Ian Miller，1990 年。《血仇与和解：萨迦冰岛中的世仇、法律与社会》（*Bloodtaking and Peacemaking: Feud, Law, and Society in Saga Iceland*）。芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社。一项关于冰岛民众集会法律的迷人研究，它既阐明了洛克财产权理论的起源，也描述了习惯演变为习惯法、进而演变为成文法的历史过程的后期阶段。 ### References ### 参考文献 * Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby (editors), 1992. *The Adapted mind: evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture.* N. Y.: Oxford University Press. Jerome H. Barkow､Leda Cosmides 和 John Tooby(编),1992 年｡《适应的心灵:进化心理学与文化生成》(*The Adapted mind: evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture*)｡纽约:牛津大学出版社｡ * Michael K. Goldhaber, 1997. "The Attention Economy and the Net," *First Monday,* Volume 2, Number 4 (April), at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue2_4/goldhaber/ Michael K. Goldhaber,1997 年｡"注意力经济与网络"("The Attention Economy and the Net"),《First Monday》,第 2 卷,第 4 期(4 月),见 http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue2_4/goldhaber/ * Greg Hill, 1980. *Principia discordia, or, How I found goddess and what I did to her when I found her: the magnum opiate of Malaclypse the Younger, wherein is explained absolutely everything worth knowing about absolutely anything.* 2nd edition. Port Townsend, Wash.: Loompanics. Greg Hill,1980 年｡《Principia Discordia》,或《我如何找到女神以及找到她后对她做了什么:小马拉凯普斯的伟大鸦片,其中解释了关于绝对任何事的绝对一切值得知道的东西》｡第 2 版｡华盛顿州汤森港:Loompanics｡ * William Ian Miller, 1990. *Bloodtaking and peacemaking: feud, law, and society in saga Iceland.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press. William Ian Miller,1990 年｡《血仇与和解:萨迦冰岛中的世仇､法律与社会》(*Bloodtaking and peacemaking: feud, law, and society in saga Iceland*)｡芝加哥:芝加哥大学出版社｡ * Eric S. Raymond, 1998. "A Brief history of hackerdom," at http://earthspace.net/\~esr/faqs/hacker-hist.html Eric S. Raymond,1998 年｡"黑客文化简史"("A Brief history of hackerdom"),见 http://earthspace.net/\~esr/faqs/hacker-hist.html *** ** * ** *** ## via： * Homesteading the Noosphere by Eric S. Raymond * homesteading.dvi - homesteading.pdf